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AGE OF UNREASON:
RATIONALITY AND THE REGULATORY STATE
Louise Weinberg*

ABSTRACT
A curious phenomenon, not previously remarked, appears in
current international and interstate cases in a common
configuration. These are cases in which a nonresident sues a
company at the company’s home; the plaintiff would almost
certainly win there on stipulated facts; and judgment is for the
defendant as a matter of law. In cases in this familiar
configuration it appears that courts will struggle to find rationales.
Judges attempt to rely on arguments which ordinarily would be
serviceable, but which, in cases so configured, seem to become
irrational. Because the relevant configuration of cases is common,
the problem is widespread. And it is serious. A judgment
unsupported by good reasons will appear to be a naked preference
for the judgment winner. The Supreme Court has held that the bare
appearance of a want of neutrality is a denial of due process.
Many cases are cited, but this Article focuses on two recent
examples, seemingly unrelated. The first example is a prominent
international case in the United States Supreme Court, raising an
issue of statutory construction. The second is an interstate case in a
state supreme court, raising an issue of choice of law. But these
disparate examples are importantly similar in that both are in the
above-described configuration, and in both, the trial court
withholds its own law. And in both, the court has trouble finding
rational support for the outcome. This difficulty seems to be
virtually inevitable in cases so configured. Critical and explanatory
analyses are offered. The interstate example also raises a special
problem of legal theory, discussed here as well.

*
William B. Bates Chair in the Administration of Justice and Professor of Law, the
University of Texas, Austin. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at a faculty workshop at the University of Texas Law School, Austin, March 26, 2018. I am grateful to Jeffrey
Abramson, Jennifer Laurin, Tom McGarity, Susan Morse, and Melissa Wasserman for helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is about a previously unremarked but striking phenomenon, appearing in current international and interstate cases.
These are cases in a discrete but common configuration. In this
configuration of cases, defending lawyers offer arguments that are
ordinarily effectual, and judges ruling for a defendant try to make
use of these arguments. But the usual defenses turn out to make
little sense.
This strange difficulty is apparently a function of the shape of
the litigation in which it arises. These are cases in which the plaintiff has come to a defendant company’s home to file suit; the plaintiff would almost certainly win there on stipulated facts; and judgment is for the defendant company as a matter of law. The court
holds, on some ground, that the case cannot go forward. Or an
appellate court reverses, sometimes reversing judgment on a jury
verdict. But in such cases arguments supporting judgment for the
defendant are very likely to turn sour. The ensuing struggle for
reason can readily be seen in published opinions in cases in this
configuration.
A quick look at the typical scenario will show the reader what I
mean. Suppose that in a transnational case an American company
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is sued at home by a foreigner for a tort in violation of an act of
Congress. The stipulated facts are such that the American company almost certainly would lose on the merits under the statute. In
other words, the foreigner is forum shopping and seeks the benefit
of our law.
Since, ex hypothesi, the defendant company is likely to lose on the
merits, it cannot easily find defenses on the merits. At best, the defendant can argue for a new construction of the statute, but any
found chink in the statute is likely to be regarded by some observers as a misconstruction. If the statute could rationally be so construed, the foreign plaintiff would not have come to the United
States to sue. Plausible arguments wholly off the merits fare even
worse. I do not refer to dispositive defenses off the merits, such as a
short period of limitations. Had there been a dispositive defense
here, the foreign plaintiff would not have brought suit here.
Now suppose that the American defendant moves to dismiss,
and the federal court grants the motion. The court relies chiefly
on the argument that adjudicating the case would be injurious to
the foreign relations of the United States. It also emphasizes that
the foreign place of injury, which is also the place where the plaintiff resides, is more nearly concerned with the case than is the
United States, since our only contact with the case is as residence
of the defendant company. On such facts our contact with the case
might be argued to be so tenuous as to make the case extraterritorial to us. Often, too, a dismissing court will rely on a choice of foreign law, or a putatively more convenient forum abroad.
It appears to be a characteristic feature of cases thus configured
that these sorts of considerations, usually quite effective, lose force.
Ex hypothesi, American law in such cases is plaintiff-favoring. (The
reader will recall that the foreign plaintiff has come to our courts
shopping for our law.) In these cases, the usual defenses tend to
benefit the foreign plaintiff, not the American defendant raising
the defense. When judgment for the defendant in such a case is
sought to be supported by judicial concern for our foreign relations, for example, it is often the fact that a failure to allow the foreign plaintiff to proceed is more likely to offend the plaintiff’s home
country. The foreign country would be best accommodated by affording the benefit of American law to the foreign country’s own
national.
Or, to take another example, suppose that the court rules that
the plaintiff’s home country—Scotland, let us say—has “the more
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significant contact” with the case, since it was also the place of injury as well as the plaintiff’s home country. Therefore, Scottish law,
which provides a defense in such cases, should be applied—
especially since deference to Scottish law would be in exercise of a
benevolent comity.
Yet Scotland has no interest in applying its defense. Defenses are
naturally enacted or devised for the benefit of local companies and
companies doing business in the locality. Scotland has zero interest
in protecting from liability all the world’s companies. It has zero
interest in protecting from liability an American company without
any connection with Scotland. And Scotland has zero interest in
frustrating a Scottish citizen’s chance to recover in America from
an American company.
Cases, of course, can go either way. So it is not unusual for
American courts to conform to our examples, and to give judgment for the American defendant. But in such cases the judgment
is all too likely to have been awarded to the defendant home party
for no good reason—that is, for reasons which, as we have just
seen, can have less rational application in the case than might have
been expected. The phenomenon occurs in both international
and interstate litigation.
Unfortunately, when handing down this sort of ordinary judgment in a case configured in the ordinary way just described, relying on the ordinarily persuasive sorts of reasons here noted, a
court can strip its judgment of an appearance of neutrality. The
2
problem is serious, and it is widespread. If the judgment lacks a

1.

This is the widely adopted formula set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
(1967).
2.
The following are selections of current transnational and interstate cases in federal
courts and state high courts, tending to show near-arbitrary decisions not to enforce law
when it would regulate the conduct of a defendant. (State lower-court cases or earlier cases
are too numerous for inclusion.)
In the Supreme Court of the United States, for a few representative recent transnational examples, see, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 (2017) (denying foreign detainees a right to sue federal officials because the action to enforce the Constitution is “disfavored”); RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (discussed here)
(denying relief for foreign nations suing an allegedly racketeering American company because the statute does not repeat its language of extraterritoriality when incorporating legislation having such language); Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882
(2010) (denying relief to purchasers of stock in an action against an American defendant to
enforce American law against fraud in the sale of securities on the ground that the stock
exchange and transactions thereon were abroad).
For a recent interstate case in the Supreme Court, see Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 136
S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (setting a $50,000 cap on damages on the novel ground that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause requires a state to apply its own law; attempting to justify this by detecting “hostility” at the forum state, although the state’s high court had remittitured most
of the jury’s award, reducing damages from some $450 million to $1 million).
In the United States Courts of Appeals, for representative recent transnational cases,
see, e.g., Armada (Singapore) PTE v. Amcol Internat’l Corp., 885 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 2018)
OF LAWS
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rational basis it will appear, at least to those alert to the problem,
like a naked preference for the home party. The Supreme Court
has held that the bare appearance of a want of neutrality is a denial
3
of due process. I think of this as a “neutrality difficulty.”

(affirming dismissal of a Civil RICO claim against an Illinois defendant because the injury
occurred abroad, although the defendant’s conduct was within the regulatory scope of the
statute); Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018) (on remand, ruling, in pertinent
part, that our foreign relations with Mexico would be damaged if we allowed the grieving
Mexican family to recover for the wrongful death of their boy at the hands of a United
States border official, where Mexico had filed a brief urging justice for the family); Mujica v.
Airscan Inc., 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014) (ruling that wrongful death and personal injuries
claims by Colombian citizens against an American company could not go forward under the
Torture Victims Protection Act because not justiciable under the doctrine of “international
comity,” notwithstanding the statute); Bulgaria Ltd. v. Bulgarian-American Enterprise Fund,
589 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal for forum non conveniens of a case by a British company against an American organization on the ground that Bulgarian courts are not
inadequate).
In the United States District Courts, for a few representative recent examples, see, e.g.,
Dantas v. Citibank, 2018 WL 3023158 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (dismissing for “prudential” considerations “favoring settlements” a challenge by a foreign plaintiff to a settlement with an American defendant allegedly obtained under duress); Gerba v. Nat’l Hellenic Museum, 2018 WL
3068409 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (dismissing a nonresident plaintiff’s action for retaliatory firing of a
whistleblower because the complaint alleged wrongdoing, but not that the wrongdoing was
criminal); Otto Candies v. Citigroup, 2018 WL 3008740 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (dismissing for forum non conveniens a case brought by various foreign companies against an American company alleging conspiracy to commit violations of RICO in a wide range of countries on the
supposition that Mexican courts are adequate and more convenient).
In the state supreme courts, for a few recent representative transnational cases, see, e.g.,
America K-9 Detection Services, LLC v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. 2018) (holding nonjusticiable under the “political questions” doctrine a negligence case involving a contract
working-dog biting a civilian on a foreign military base); Aranda v. Philip Morris, 2018 WL
1415215 (Del. 2018) (affirming dismissal for forum non conveniens in a case brought by Argentine tobacco farmers to challenge an American grower’s demand that they use pesticides
causing illness in growers’ employees); Gramercy Emerging Markets Fund v. Allied Irish
Banks, P.L.C, 173 A.3d 1033 (Del. 2017) (affirming dismissal for forum non conveniens of
claims “arising” in Bulgaria); Jahnke v. Deere & Co, 2018 WL 2271338 (Iowa 2018) (holding
an Iowa civil rights statute could not be applied extraterritorially to an Iowan alleging discrimination in employment by an American company when it demoted him by transferring
him to a post in Iowa from a better position in China).
In interstate cases in the state supreme courts, for a few recent representative examples, see, e.g., MM.M. v. Pfizer, Inc., 239 W.Va. 876 (2017) (applying the law of a state without
any interest in its application); Ross v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 89 N.E.3d 763 (Ill. 2017)
(mandating interlocutory review of a denial of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens,
which is discretionary); Bayer Corp. v. Hon. Joan L. Moriarty, 536 S.W.3d 227 (Mo. 2017)
(en banc) (holding that nonresident plaintiffs could obtain neither specific nor general jurisdiction in Missouri over a corporation, notwithstanding that there already was jurisdiction
in a parallel action by similarly injured Missouri plaintiffs); Almond v. Rudolph, 794 S.E.2d
10 (W.Va. 2016) (holding unavailable a writ of prohibition to prevent dismissal of nonresidents from a product liability class suit, on grounds of forum non conveniens); American Electric Power Co. v. Swope, 301 S.E.2d 485 (W.Va. 2017) (granting a writ of prohibition against
denial of a motion to dismiss on the assumption that Ohio law must govern); Laugelle v.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 10C–12–054, 2013 WL 5460164 (Del. Super. 2013) (in a
wrongful death suit, applying the law of the place of the grieving family’s mental anguish to
deny recovery for mental anguish).
3.
See Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that a state supreme court judge’s repeated refusal to recuse himself created an appearance of a want of
neutrality in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, where a
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When I speak of “neutrality,” I do not mean to suggest some
equivalence between plaintiffs and defendants. The blindness of
Lady Justice is not a blindness to the difference between those who
can plead injuries and those who allegedly caused them. Blind Justice, rather, would decline to place on the scales all distinctions of
status, power, or wealth; all distinctions of person, fealty, or belief;
and, above all, any connection between a party and the judge that
nevertheless adjudicates that party’s case. The connection could be
familial or commercial. It could be the appearance of a bribe or a
threat. Perhaps the most common connection between a court and
a litigant is the widely presumed home court advantage enjoyed by
a resident party in an interstate or international case.
To the extent that the home court advantage exists, it is a slight
but not trivial predilection of judges to favor a valuable or vulnerable local enterprise. This protective inclination could be what
comes into play in our narrowly defined but common configuration of cases. Or it could be an ideological or political defendantorientedness. Like plaintiff-orientedness, defendant-orientedness is
a psychological reality about which there is little useful to be said
or done. Such predilections, conscious or unconscious, seem likely
to be at play in litigation generally. But it is only in our specific
configuration of cases that judgment for the defendant so dependably seems to entail a struggle for, and failure of, reason.
As for the shopped-for home law in the configuration of cases
under study here, I would characterize it, in the run of cases, as
“regulatory.” The defendant resides at the forum state, but forum
law does not favor the defendant. It exposes the defendant to liability. We will be exploring, here, the limits, if any, of the reach of
regulatory law beyond borders. In particular, we will be investigating the curious irrationality of argument accompanying a court’s
departure from its own regulatory law. And we will come up against
that little “neutrality difficulty.”
We will be working with two illustrative—but very different—
cases. Our international case turns on statutory construction. Our
interstate case turns on choice of law. What these two disparate
cases have in common is that, in each, the nonresident has come
to the defendant’s home to find favorable law there. In other
words, local law, from the point of view of the resident company, is
regulatory. In each of our examples, the court at the defendant’s
home looks with disfavor at the nonresident plaintiff’s case, and
local law is held unavailable. And, in each, there ensues a struggle

party appearing before an appellate panel that included that judge had contributed $3 million to his election campaign).
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for reason. Reasonable and ordinary justifications for withholding
local law in cases configured like this will appear insufficient to
support the result. This struggle for reason is the strange feature
that prompted the writing of this paper.
In these dissimilar examples, we find that the neutrality difficulty—in itself a denial of due process—carries with it not only the
curious irrationality of argument that engenders it, but also a host
of other signs of dysfunction. These include an inattentiveness to
the regulatory interests of the sovereign adjudicating the case; a
disregard of the judicial oath of office; a challenge to democratic
theory; and ultimately a sense that the rule of law has been impotent and that there has been a failure of justice.
I.

OUR INTERNATIONAL CASE: RJR-NABISCO V. EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
A. A Troubled History

Consider the 2016 Supreme Court case of RJR-Nabisco¸ Inc. v. Eu4
ropean Community. RJR-Nabisco involved seriously tortious—indeed,
criminal—violations of an act of Congress, the federal anti5
racketeering law familiarly known as RICO.
In RICO, Congress took hold of the problem of organized
crime. RICO offers not only criminal penalties and government
enforcement mechanisms civil in form, but also, with so-called
6
“Civil RICO,” a statutory private right to sue for damages —
7
damages that are trebled. Corporations as well as organized Mafia-

4.
136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). For recent comment on RJR-Nabisco from another structural
perspective, see Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public Enforcement, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1077
(2018). On the territorialism of RJR-Nabisco, see Victoria Safran, RICO’s Extraterritorial Reach:
The Impact of European Community v. RJR-Nabisco, 4 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 47 (2017); Note,
“Supreme Court Review,” Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act—
Extraterritoriality—RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 130 HARV. L. REV. 487 (2016).
5.
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968.
6.
18 U.S.C. § 1964.
7.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). This provision in RICO is modeled on the Clayton Act. See S.
REP. NO. 91-617 at 79, 80–81 (stating that “[t]he committee feels . . . that much can be accomplished here by adopting the civil remedies developed in the antitrust field to the problem of organized crime”). As in the Clayton Act, and as is usual when Congress provides for
treble damages, Civil RICO also provides for attorney fees and costs. 18 U.S.C. § 1964. One
might suppose that punitive damages also would be available under Civil Rico. But, as in
antitrust suits under the Clayton Act, punitive damages are considered to be subsumed under treble damages. Cf. Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257 (1989) (approving an award of treble damages on a federal antitrust claim and
punitive damages on a pendent state claim).

8
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like groups can be drawn into Civil RICO litigation if they engage
8
in certain criminal activities in violation of RICO.
The alleged tortfeasor in RJR-Nabisco had originally been a prosperous American corporation, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company,
growing tobacco in North Carolina and producing Camel ciga9
rettes. As concern developed about the hazards of smoking, R. J.
Reynolds originated filtered cigarettes, and later, mentholated cigarettes. But the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer
was becoming clearer. The long ordeal of litigation against the
company got under way. Burdened by suits for wrongful death and
personal injuries, RJR became a target not only of class action lawyers, but also of legislative committees, prosecutors, and investigative journalists. Their combined researches eventually revealed that
10
the company had been lying for decades. RJR had been lying
about the hazards of cigarette smoking. It had lied about the
healthfulness of filtered cigarettes and of mentholated cigarettes.
It was lying about addiction. As its troubles multiplied, the company began moving deliberately to make its cigarettes even more addictive, and lying about those efforts. Ultimately, RJR was working
hard to entice children, efforts that became more zealous over
11
time.
The company’s problems were compounded by its management’s efforts to overcome them. There was a flurry of spin-offs
and leveraged mergers and acquisitions. RJR became a conglomerate, an owner not only of tobacco companies like Brown & Williamson, but also, most prominently, of Nabisco, formerly the National Biscuit Company, particularly valued for its popular Oreo
cookies. In RJR’s atmosphere of moral degradation, some of its executives sought to profit personally from these maneuvers, engaging in insider trading. Some were systematically looting the company through bloated compensation packages and perquisites. All
12
this left the American tobacco giant crippled.
8.
See, e.g., H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (RICO
action against a telephone company for injunctive relief); Republic of Iraq v. Abb AG, 768
F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2014) (including a RICO action by a foreign sovereign).
9.
For RJR’s own account of its history, see R. J. Reynolds Tobacco, A Look into Our Past,
https://www.rjrt.com/transforming-tobacco/history/.
10.
See generally, e.g., PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR Of JUSTICE
(2014); MICHAEL RABINOFF, ENDING THE TOBACCO HOLOCAUST: HOW BIG TOBACCO AFFECTS
OUR HEALTH, POCKETBOOK AND POLITICAL FREEDOM—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT
(2010); MARK WOLFSON, THE FIGHT AGAINST BIG TOBACCO: THE MOVEMENT, THE STATE AND
THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH (2001).
11.
See generally, e.g., BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE
FALL OF RJR-NABISCO (1990); Report, “Camel Cigarettes: A Long History of Targeting Camels
to Kids,” https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/microsites/camel/Camel_History.pdf.
12.
Floyd Norris, Fund Books Loss on RJR After 15 years: A Long Chapter Ends for Kohlberg
Kravis, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at B1 (reporting that “[t]he greatest leveraged buyout ever is
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The case that is the focus of these pages began back in 2001, in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York. This was an action brought by the European Community,
13
representing twenty-six member countries. According to the
Community’s complexly pleaded complaint—amended and reamended as the litigation wore on—RJR-Nabisco was the instigator,
supervisor, leading actor, and chief beneficiary of a circular fourway trade involving narcotics, support of terrorism, money laun14
dering, and black marketeering. If we focus on the primary allegations, taking them as true, we can glimpse the main outlines of
the scheme.
To begin with, narcotics were obtained by RJR-Nabisco for export to Europe, largely through Colombian intermediaries. The
narcotics were then shipped from South America through the
Panama Canal with a cargo of RJR-Nabisco’s Camel cigarettes. This
route was chosen to insulate the narcotics in the cargo from scrutiny at a U.S. port. The narcotics and the Camels would be made
available on Europe’s black markets. (Cigarettes can be heavily
regulated in European countries, with the result that in those
countries there are profitable black markets for cigarettes. Camel
cigarettes are favored by European smokers for their combination
of Turkish and American tobaccos.) European customers for the
narcotics or cigarettes paid for them with euros. Some of these euros were used, with the assistance of Russian intermediaries, to buy
Turkish tobacco and additional supplies of narcotics from terrorist
groups. The foreign black marketers and other conspirators openly
exchanged these euros for dollars. The Turkish tobacco was
shipped to RJR in North Carolina. After the various foreign agents
took their respective cuts in euros or dollars the remaining freshlylaundered dollars were exported to RJR in payment, and the cycle
would recommence. This is just one understanding of the complaint, but it suffices to convey the general nature of the alleged
15
enterprise.
ending, not with a bang but with a whimper of loss. After 15 years of scrambling and pain,
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts is through with its investment in RJR-Nabisco.”); Constance L.
Hays, The Overview, End of an Empire: RJR-Nabisco Splits Tobacco Ventures and Food Business, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/?1999/03/10/?business/end-empireoverview-rjr-nabisco-splits-tobacco-ventures-food-business.html.
13.
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). The European Community was one of three European trade organizations. In 2009, it was absorbed
by the European Union. See Matthew J. Gabel, European Community, BRITANNICA
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Community-Europeaneconomic-?association.
14.
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2014).
15.
The complaint also alleged that RJR-Nabisco’s employees would take monthly trips
from the United States to Colombia through Venezuela, bribe border guards in order to
enter Colombia illegally, receive payments there, travel back to Venezuela, and wire the

10
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In conducting these operations, RJR was allegedly acting in violation of RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza16
tions Act. The lawsuit in federal District Court in Brooklyn was a
17
“Civil RICO” action. Both civil and criminal liabilities under
RICO require that a defendant enterprise engage in a pattern of
18
19
violations of enumerated predicate crimes. A pattern of violations is properly pleaded if at least two predicate criminal viola20
tions are alleged.
RJR-Nabisco was allegedly committing several predicate crimes,
21
22
23
including mail fraud, support of terrorism, money laundering,
24
and violations of the Travel Act.
The complaint pleaded injuries to and within the twenty-six
countries represented by the plaintiff European Community. But
there were also allegations of American domestic injuries. Perhaps
the European Community pleaded American injuries to help the
District Court to see the defendant’s conduct as evoking the nafunds to RJR’s accounts in the United States; that RJR’s employees filed fraudulent documents with the U.S. Customs Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to
further the scheme; and that RJR acquired Brown & Williamson Tobacco for the purpose of
expanding its illegal activities. Apparently, the business of money-laundering in support of
terrorism generally follows the trade routes outlined here and in the text, with the participation of Colombians and Russians. Cf. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, Drug Trafficking and the
Financing of Terrorism, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/drug-trafficking-andthe-financing-of-terrorism.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2019) (noting that “drug trafficking has
provided funding for insurgent groups in various regions throughout the world”).
16.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (1988).
17.
RICO creates a private civil cause of action available to “[a]ny person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation” of its prohibitions. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
Jurisdiction is vested in the federal district courts. Plaintiffs may recover treble damages,
costs, and attorney’s fees. These remedies are modeled on the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–
27 (2012), which, in addition to furnishing additional substantive provisions to flesh out the
Sherman Antitrust Act, provides rights to sue, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012) (at law); id. at § 15
(remedies, including treble damages, fees, and costs); id. at § 26 (injunction).
18.
RICO’s prohibition of “pattern[s] of racketeering activity” is set out at 18 U.S.C. §
1962, and a pattern of racketeering activity is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) as the committing of two or more predicate crimes within a ten-year period.
19.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), 1961(5), 1962(c).
20.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
21.
18 U.S.C. § 1341.
22.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001). The Patriot Act was enacted in response to the Islamic terror attacks on the
United States of September 11, 2001, by four passenger jets hijacked by Saudi individuals
working out of Hamburg. Two of the hijacked jets flew into the twin skyscraper towers of the
World Trade Center, causing their burning and collapse and ultimately obliterating a large
part of lower Manhattan, the city’s financial district, including seven office buildings and a
subway station. A third hijacked jet destroyed a part of the Pentagon, near Washington,
D.C., in Virginia. A fourth hijacked jet, believed to be on course to crash into the Capitol,
was brought down in Pennsylvania by its heroic passengers. These attacks killed some 3,000
individuals in addition to the hundreds of hijacked passengers.
23.
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012).
24.
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012) (prohibiting use of the U.S. mails or any means of interstate or international travel in furtherance of criminal activity).
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tional interests underlying RICO. But the Europeans waived those
domestic American claims, perhaps doubting their standing to
raise them. This put District Judge Garaufis in position to throw
the foreign violations out with the domestic ones—which he did,
25
on grounds of extraterritoriality. (This waiver also put the Supreme Court in the same position. It, too, would throw out the
26
same baby with the same bathwater. ) Judge Garaufis could cite in
support of the dismissal the emerging “new territorialism” of the
27
Supreme Court.
B. A Problematic Presumption
The “new territorialism” appears to be the old territorialism, superimposed belatedly on subjects previously not understood to be
strictly under such constraint. The traditional American territorialist view, at its most problematic, was a conviction that the Constitution of the United States had no bearing on the conduct of federal
officials beyond our borders; nor did the United States have any
interest in the effects of a federal official’s misconduct as experi28
enced beyond our borders. This, notwithstanding the lack of any

25.
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
26.
RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016).
27.
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (interpreting the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)); Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S.
247 (2010) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78(a) (fraud in the purchase and
sale of securities)). For commentary, see generally “Symposium on Extraterritoriality,” 99
CORNELL L. REV. (2014), with articles by John Coffee, Anthony Colangelo, Eugene Kontorovich, Jenny Martinez, Gerald Neuman, Louise Weinberg, and Juliet Moringiello & William
Reynolds.
28.
The supposed inability of American courts to apply the Constitution beyond our
borders is often traced to The Insular Cases (Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)). But the individual holdings in these cases do not seem to
support the assertion particularly well. Downes, for example, held that the transaction at issue did not come within the relevant constitutional language. Balzac did hold that the Sixth
Amendment did not apply in Puerto Rico, but that is a position that might be different today. Modern discussions can be more contextual than territorial, involving the question
whether there are “substantial connections” with the United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). On the general question of the extraterritoriality
of the Constitution in our own time, see Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritoriality and the Interest of
the United States in Regulating Its Own, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1441 (2014) (commenting on
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)). In this impressive paper, Professor Neuman
suggests grounds for optimism that Boumediene put a significant crimp in our newly-revived
territorialism, since the case extended the protection of the Constitution to territory in Cuba. But Boumediene seems too easy a case for optimism, since the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay are under the custody and control of the United States. To some extent this
feature of control is shared by the border gulch involved in the cross-border shooting case
of Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017), on remand, 869 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2017), cert.
granted, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019), discussed infra note 29. I should add that I share Professor
Neuman’s conviction that federal officials must act constitutionally wherever they act. There
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legitimate national interest in licensing our officials to behave badly when overseas, and notwithstanding our actual interests in reputation, honor, dignity, reliability, and the esteem these intangible
characteristics foster. Territorialism at that extreme had been a
mistake, as the Supreme Court seems to know, but one that the
29
Court seems reluctant to correct.
In its current form, territorialism, at best, reflects a belief that
the United States exhibits a courteous attention to the comity of
nations by declining to interfere with a foreign sovereign’s control
over events occurring within that sovereign’s own borders. This politesse can take many forms, but latterly appears in a hoary canon of
statutory construction, an old rule that, in the silence of Congress
about the territorial scope of a statute, the statute is presumed to
30
have domestic application only. That is the rule lately revived and
31
inserted into securities fraud cases in Morrison v. Bank of Australia.
That is the rule recently extended to transnational human rights
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro32
leum Co. The presumption against extraterritorial application of

is an obvious parallel between Professor Neuman’s position vis-à-vis American officials to the
position taken in this paper vis-à-vis American companies and their officials.
29.
See the punt by the United States Supreme Court in Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct.
2003 (2017), on remand, 869 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019). In
Mesa, a federal border patrol agent standing on American soil fired two shots at a Mexican
boy cowering behind a column on Mexican soil, killing the boy. In oral argument in the Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor protested, “Wouldn’t shooting potshots at Mexican citizens
be shocking to the conscience?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137
S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118). In that initial round, the Supreme Court was evidently too
embarrassed to deny extraterritorial constitutional duties on the part of United States officials, or to view the border gulch, wholly under United States control, as extraterritorial.
Instead, the Court remanded to the Fifth Circuit to determine whether special factors counseled hesitation vis-à-vis the availability of a Bivens claim for damages. The Court of Appeals
dutifully found that special factors counseled hesitation. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811
(5th Cir. 2018). Predictably, the arguments deployed in the Fifth Circuit on remand were
irrational. For example, potential harm in our “foreign affairs” was held to be a special factor counseling hesitation, although Mexico will be offended by the denial of relief to the
grieving Mexican family. 885 F.3d, at 819; see of the Government of the United Mexican
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 17-1678 (July
20, 2018); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 17-1678 (June 15,
2018) (noting the irrationality of the foreign relations argument). The parents again petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Certiorari was granted to decide the question of
whether a Bivens action will ever be available for a plausibly pleaded violation of clearly established law by a rogue federal official. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019). The
case was argued November 12, 2019.
30.
For thoughtful consideration of the territorial question in contracts cases in both
kinds of inter-sovereign litigation, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Determining the Territorial Scope of
State Law in Interstate and International Conflicts: Comments on the Draft Restatement (Third) and
on the Role of Party Autonomy, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 381 (2017).
31.
Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
32.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). Kiobel rendered the Alien Tort Statute [ATS] a virtual nullity in the only cases for which it mattered, the case on
wholly foreign facts, in effect deleting perhaps the greatest lower-court case in American
legal history, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In Filartiga, the Second Cir-
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law can be overcome, but according to Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court in Kiobel, only if a case “touches and concerns”
the United States with “sufficient force” to overcome the presump33
tion. And now, just as the federal Courts of Appeals are struggling
to define what “touches and concerns” the United States “with sufficient force,” they must also struggle to identify a “focus.” Under
Morrison, it appears that what “touches and concerns” must be a
34
“focus” of the legislature’s own concern. But the Supreme Court
35
has also looked to the “gravamen” of a complaint.
cuit held, by Judge Kaufman, that the perpetrator of foreign atrocities is hostis human generis,
the enemy of all mankind, and that it is in the “collective” interest of all nations to open
their courts to civil suits against that enemy wherever found. Id. at 890. The transnational
case is the only significant case under the ATS; our courts already have power, however limited, over violations of human rights occurring here and have no urgent need of Filartiga for
domestic cases. See Louise Weinberg, What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk About Extraterritoriality: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1471 (2014).
In Kiobel, Chief Justice Roberts explained that, because the ATS was a jurisdictional
grant only, the question was whether claims thereunder could be extended extraterritorially.
However, he did not explain why a presumption against extraterritorial application of legislation could be relevant to the common law claim pleaded in Kiobel. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115.
That was a cause of action made cognizable under the great case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala..
The supposition that the ATS is only jurisdictional probably derives in part from its being
couched at its outset as a jurisdictional grant. But it is also easily read to provide a cause of
action for which the jurisdiction is granted, an action “for a tort . . . in violation of the law of
nations.” See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (2012)) (“And be it further enacted, That the district courts shall have . . . cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of
all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”). But see Jara v. Núñez, 878 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2018) (following
the reasoning of the Supreme Court; ruling that the “focus” of the claim in the case was extraterritorial and that therefore there was no jurisdiction).
Occasionally a court can be found working around the Court’s demolition of the ATS,
perhaps not very convincingly. To take a recent example, in Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d
1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2018), the Court of Appeals ruled that allegations of funding child slavery in the Ivory Coast related to the required “focus,” and held (taking advantage of the Supreme Court’s not having determined whether aiding and abetting claims are cognizable
under the ATS), that the plaintiffs, former child slaves, could plead a cause of action under
the ATS for aiding and abetting child slavery. The Ninth Circuit here was eliding the further
question of corporate liability vel non, which had been decided in the negative a few months
previously in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018), also arguably a case of secondary liability.
33.
Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25.
34.
See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010) (stating that
there was nothing in the “focus” of the securities fraud section of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to suggest a national interest in regulating foreign exchanges); 15 U.S.C. §
78(a); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2018) (civil liability for fraud in the purchase and sale of securities).
For an interesting recent case converting the “focus” test into a modified interest analysis, see In re Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 917 F.3d 85 (2d
Cir. 2019) (ruling that the “focus” question was whether the relevant transfers were sufficiently domestic to warrant application of our law, and that the United States’ interest in
applying its law to disputes arising out of a fraudulent transfer of funds from the Madoff
debtor’s United States bank accounts in furtherance of a massive Ponzi scheme orchestrated
by him outweighed the interest of any foreign state).
35.
OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 394–95 (2015) (holding that an
American woman who purchased a Eurail pass passenger ticket in the United States, but fell
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In RJR-Nabisco, the Second Circuit cut this Gordian knot. The
court simply found the extraterritoriality argument altogether unconvincing, without regard to any of these niceties. Abstract
“rules,” “tests,” “doctrines,” and the like, superimposed on a real
problem, will not necessarily provide real understanding of that
problem or rational solutions for it. The Second Circuit panel va36
cated the District Court’s judgment of dismissal and remanded.
Judge Leval, concurring, pointed out that a RICO defendant must
have committed predicate offenses. Otherwise no Civil RICO action could lie. And as to each of RJR-Nabisco’s alleged predicate
offenses, Congress had clearly manifested its intention that the leg37
islation apply extraterritorially. The explicit extraterritoriality of
all of RJR-Nabisco’s particular predicate violations made Con38
gress’s purposes quite clear. The Second Circuit denied rehearing
39
en banc. In my view Judge Leval was right. I venture to add that the
regulatory interests underlying the statute could not rationally be
40
limited to our borders.
41
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held, by Justice Alito
42
(four to three ), that Civil RICO could not ground an otherwise
proper action when the damages complained of were incurred
43
abroad.
C. The Struggle for Reason
On these facts my adroit reader has already predicted that, in
RJR-Nabisco, Justice Alito would have had to struggle to find plausible reasons to support his insistence, for any recovery, that the injuries alleged be domestic. Let us consider six key aspects of that
territorialist struggle.
(1) Foreign relations and extraterritoriality. Justice Alito’s least persuasive attempt to support the Court’s ruling may have been his

between platform and train on an Austrian railway, could not sue, the “gravamen” of her
complaint having to do with her injury abroad, rather than her contract here).
36.
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 764 F.3d 129, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2014).
37.
Id. at 134.
38.
The anti-terror and money laundering predicates at issue were part of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, enacted in response to the 9/11 attacks on this country, supra note 22.
39.
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 783 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2015).
40.
For the rational reach of regulatory law, see infra Parts I-D, II-D, III-B.
41.
RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016). For recent
commentary on RJR-Nabisco, see supra note 4.
42.
Justice Sotomayor did not take part, and there was also the seat left vacant by Justice
Scalia’s death. Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined Alito’s opinion as
to Parts I, II, and III, and dissented from the remainder and the judgment.
43.
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2111.
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argument that permitting application of Civil RICO to foreign
events would produce “friction” in our foreign relations. As Justice
Alito put this, “[P]roviding a private civil remedy for foreign con44
duct creates a potential for international friction . . . .”
Thus Justice Alito began his fall down the rabbit hole of unreason. Even if his point about “friction” in our international relations
were not a speculation about a potential problem in some other
case in the future, an observer might well find irrational the fear
that some day a foreign country might be offended by making an
American malefactor pay damages to it. Justice Alito found votes
for this position, but the reader, I think, can see here the souring
of common defenses that occasioned this paper.
Nevertheless, let us take this concern about “friction” seriously.
We can say that it rests on the reasonable view that every sovereign
has its own mode of redress for injuries, and no sovereign should
be expected to suffer gladly what amounts to a denigration of its
own control over events within its own borders. So far, so good. But
RJR-Nabisco falls into irrationality when the Court asks us to believe
that foreign countries, themselves seeking justice under an act of
45
Congress, will be content only if we show them the door.
Thus it was that, having bracingly reminded us that “We cannot
46
rule the world,” Justice Alito wound up declining to rule a company in North Carolina.
(2) Foreign relations and delicate balances. In a recent case involving
American parties and an injury occurring in Mexico, Judge Posner
47
voiced similar trepidations, particularly when it comes to damages. Posner suggested that the generosity of American recoveries
could be inappropriate when measured against the standards of
48
under-developed countries.
This problem of over-generosity and under-development was a
particular concern of Justice Alito in RJR-Nabisco. “Even when foreign countries permit private rights of action,” he wrote, “they often have different schemes for litigating them and may approve of
different measures of damages. Allowing [foreigners] to pursue
private suits in the United States [might] upset that delicate bal49
ance and offend the sovereign interests of foreign nations.”

44.
Id. at 2106.
45.
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 17-1678, supra note
29.
46.
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct., at 2100 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,
454 (2007)).
47.
Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999).
48.
Id.
49.
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106-07.
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Here we see the hazards of applying abstract reasoning to real
facts. Justice Alito, although vaguely referring to “foreigners” who
choose to pursue their litigation here, was really concerned about
a foreign defendant, because the defendant, a foreign company, is
the party that Alito was imagining might be required to pay damages on a scale out of proportion with customary damages in its
own country. Who is this defendant company, hailing from an under-developed country, a company that can be sued here, and one
that is unfairly surprised by a trebling of damages? (This is hardly
the case the Court was called upon to decide, but let us deal with it
as if it were.) We can see at once that this third-world defendant is
a chimera. A third-world company will not be amenable to suit
50
here unless it is “at home” here. A company sophisticated enough
to be at home in the United States and sufficiently sophisticated to
be doing business here—and sufficiently successful to be worth suing—is sophisticated enough to have a lawyer and to know that it is
under a duty to conform to American law. This company is not
surprised by treble damages.
Moreover, the damages that Justice Alito was worried about trebling are very different from the real-life damages this mythical
third world company might actually be called upon to pay. Under
51
Civil RICO, damages are simply actual economic damages. In
other words, these are damages sustained at that foreign place at
52
the relevant time.
To be sure, these are to be trebled, and this led Justice Alito to
reason, from the conjecturally more limited remedies available
under foreign law, that Congress’s provision of treble damages
should not govern the case before him. However, there was no foreign defendant in RJR-Nabisco to protect from American treble
damages. The argument had no rational application in a case
against an American company making and selling its products
here.
In the face of such verities, Justice Alito doubled down. Glimpsing the irrationality of the argument about treble damages levied

50.
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (holding, in pertinent part,
that a company must be “at home” at the forum attempting to assert general jurisdiction
over it, with the implication that the forum must be the place of incorporation or a principal
place of business).
51.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .”) (emphasis added).
52.
See Guinness v. Miller, 291 F. 769 (S.D.N.Y 1923) (Hand, L.: “The form of the obligation must therefore be to indemnify the victim for his loss in terms of the money of the
foreign sovereign, and that obligation necessarily speaks as of the time when it arose; that is,
when the loss occurred.”).
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on foreigners, he fell back on the speculation that the need to respect delicate balances in foreign law would be more pressing in
other cases, and therefore should simply be applied in all cases. And
in doing so he pasted over his inapposite concern for foreign defendants under a very different, and apposite, concern for foreign
plaintiffs:
Respondents urge that concerns about international friction are inapplicable in this case because here the plaintiffs
are not foreign citizens seeking to bypass their home countries’ less generous remedies but rather the foreign countries themselves . . . . . Even assuming that this is true, however, . . . [w]e reject the notion that we should forgo the
presumption against extraterritoriality and instead permit
extraterritorial suits based on a case-by-case inquiry . . . . Rather than guess anew in each case, we apply the presump53
tion in all cases . . . .
Justice Alito continued, “Respondents suggest that we should . . .
discard [our] reservations when a foreign state sues a U.S. entity in
this country under U.S. law—instead of in its own courts and under its own laws—for conduct committed on its own soil. We refuse
54
to adopt this double standard.” He concluded, “Although ‘a risk
of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law’ is not a
prerequisite for applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, where such a risk is evident, the need to enforce the presump55
tion is at its apex.” Yet there was no such risk—and, indeed, no
conflict—in the case. All these countries were in perfect agreement
with our law and sought its benefit.
In my view, RJR-Nabisco, a sophisticated but predatory American
company, if in violation of RICO, richly deserved the purely economic penalty Congress provided for a pattern of violations of our
laws. With treble damages, Congress struck its own balance between too low a penalty on the one hand, and jury-awarded punitive damages on the other.
(3) The text and the territorial presumption. Justice Alito soldiered
on, figuratively shrugging off what must have been, to him, a sur-

53.
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108. The reader may note Justice Alito’s hostility to the
forum-shopping plaintiffs. In my view, it is a court’s hostility to a nonresident that presents a
problem, not the nonresident who seeks justice where it is available. In RJR itself, the forum
was particularly suited to a case brought by a multi-membered plaintiff class alleging a series
of complex international transactions. The federal district court in the Eastern District of
New York is renowned for its competence in complex cases.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at 2107.
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prising unsuitability of anything he could think of to say in support
of his concerns about foreign relations, damages, and delicate balances. He turned, like a drowning man sighting terra firma, to a
close reading of statutory text.
For some years it has seemed that both in the academy and in
56
the courts, “we are all textualists now.” But Justice Alito encountered some difficulty in attempting to find a textual reason for
reading a territorial limit into a regulatory statute that does not
contain one.
We can say of RICO, at the very least, that Congress’s intention
in RICO is regulatory. Congress intends to regulate rackets and
racketeering. As to that regulatory intention, in a case against
American racketeers, it could not matter where the criminal activi57
ties or the injuries consequent upon them occurred. “Thou shalt
not kill” is a command that does not vary depending upon the lo58
cation of the killing.
But in RICO, Congress did not rely solely upon the natural
reach of regulatory law, but went out of its way, in addition, and
repeatedly, to make its extraterritorial intentions explicit in every
predicate relevant to the case. Justice Alito had to acknowledge
that Congress had given RICO extraterritorial scope. As he put
this, “[I]t is hard to imagine how Congress could have more clearly
56.
Elena Kagan, “The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the
Reading of Statutes” (Harvard Law School, Nov. 18, 2015) (“We’re all textualists now.”). But
see infra note 98 and accompanying text for the insight of the American legal realists that law
cannot be construed rationally in disregard of its purposes. Although textualists have little
use for purposive reasoning, and clearly have prevailed, it seems obvious that it makes no
sense to construe a piece of text, much less an omission, in a way that defeats its purposes.
For this reason, other features of statutory constructions discounted by textualists, such as
the historical context at the time of enactment, can be very helpful. For an excruciating example of irrational and unjust textualism, see Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., for a unanimous Court, interpreting five words, “For purposes of this Chapter,” to
strip dependent twin infants of their Social Security support, because they were conceived in
vitro and posthumously born, and the state in which their wage-earner father died domiciled
would not permit posthumous children to inherit). By failing to respect the purposes of Social Security, enacted in response to the Great Depression, the Court managed to impoverish an entire family of six dependents, who thereafter, of course, would have had to share
their own modest support with the unsupported twins. See Louise Weinberg, A General Theory
of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057, 1107–14
(2013).
57.
Cf. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST., Council
Draft No. 3) at § xv.
58.
I note, however, that in a prosecution here of foreign racketeers, domestic injury
would probably have to be pleaded to provide a nexus with the case—a basis for an American court’s assertion of jurisdiction. A taking of jurisdiction, like all government action, requires some legitimate governmental interest on the part of the government involved—the
“rational basis” on which due process depends. Governmental interests, the Supreme Court
has held, are generated by a “contact” or “contacts” between the particular case and the respective government such that application of that interested government’s law is rational
and not unfair. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)).
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indicated that it intended RICO to have extraterritorial effect. [Its]
unique structure makes RICO the rare statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of ex59
traterritoriality.”
Struggling against this, Justice Alito pitched on the unlikely expedient of reading the two parallel sets of text, civil and criminal,
under two different standards. All that intention and structure and
meaning could be attributed to Criminal RICO. RJR-Nabisco’s
crimes could be prosecuted, given the explicit extraterritorial scope
of each predicate crime at issue in RJR-Nabisco, as well as the implicit extraterritorial reach Justice Alito could not help seeing in
RICO overall. But, he pointed out, Civil RICO contains no statement of its own about extraterritorial scope. (Neither does criminal RICO.)
So it was that Justice Alito went on to hold, for the Court, that
the statute’s failure to be explicit about extraterritorial application
on its civil side, unlike its equal failure on its criminal side, was fatal
to civil enforcement in the absence of domestic injury. And so Civil
60
RICO was held to be a virtual nullity in international litigation.
The interpretation of a legislative omission is bound to be
somewhat tenuous. Yet the presumption against extraterritorial
application, of course, itself depends on an omission. The canon
against extraterritoriality arises only in the silence of Congress, and
thus amounts, ironically, to a non-textual insistence on text. Omissions can be intentional, of course, but how can we tell whether
they are intentional or not? Justice Alito thought the omission intentional for Civil RICO, but thought the same omission was intended to be of no consequence in construing Criminal RICO.
The question for us is whether a statute concededly instinct with
61
extraterritorial intention can rationally ground an interpretation
that renders the statute inoperative to remedy foreign injuries in
lawsuits by foreign friends against Americans—but not in prosecutions of Americans for the same foreign injuries. The answer would
appear to be, “No,” and there is very little in the Court’s opinion
that gets us over this reality.

59.
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103.
60.
For a similar position in a state court, see the dictum in McCann v. Foster Wheeler
LLC, 225 P.3d 516 (Cal. 2010) (decreeing that thenceforth California would remedy only
those toxic tort claims arising in California, whether or not the plaintiff is a Californian, thus
furnishing a haven for California “toxic” tortfeasors who cause injuries anywhere else, and
forcing injured Californians in toxic tort cases “arising” elsewhere to have to look to courts
away from home for justice, although the general rule is that the plaintiff who can obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant can always sue at home).
61.
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103 (“[I]t is hard to imagine how Congress could have
more clearly indicated that it intended RICO to have (some) extraterritorial effect.”).

20

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:1

Indeed, it is bound to be hard to erase any statutory text in the
interest of textualism. It is hard to erase from RICO such features
as its declaration of the scope of Congress’s power under the Constitution. That appears in Congress’s definition of a Civil RICO defendant; the statute explicitly covers every defendant enterprise
which is “engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
62
foreign commerce.” As for plaintiffs, the statute is equally explicit
that its civil remedy is for the use of “[a]ny person injured in his
63
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” And
Congress explicitly mandated that the statute be given a liberal
64
construction. In light of these mandates, why was not the explicit
extraterritorial reach of each alleged predicate violation sufficient?
In fact, it is. Those violations were essential allegations of a Civil
65
RICO complaint, as Judge Leval, concurring, pointed out below.
The reader will recall that Civil RICO, like Criminal RICO, is read
to require allegations of violation of at least two predicate criminal
laws, and that each of the predicates involved in this case is explic66
itly extraterritorial in scope.
Then, too, there is the bearing of terrorism. In the wake of 9/11,
the Patriot Act added additional crimes to the list of RICO predicates, mainly money-laundering offenses abroad in support of ter67
rorism, which were among those at issue in RJR-Nabisco. With respect to that foreign conduct, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out,
dissenting from the judgment, it would be inappropriate to impose
any rule of construction which would limit “foreign allies’ access to
68
our courts to battle against money laundering.” Ginsburg also argued that Civil RICO, being a wholesale incorporation of RICO,
69
incorporates its extraterritoriality. “RICO’s private right of action . . . expressly incorporates § 1962,” she wrote, “whose extraterritoriality, the Court recognizes, is coextensive with the underlying
70
predicate offenses charged.” It appears that the textual defense in
RJR-Nabisco made as little sense as might have been expected in
71
cases in our configuration.
62.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
63.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
64.
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012) (“The provisions of [RICO] shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes.”).
65.
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 136-37 (2d. Cir. 2014).
66.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (defining a “pattern” of activity).
67.
Id.
68.
RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2113, 2117 n.3 (2016)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part).
69.
Id. at 2113.
70.
Id.
71.
In stressing the need for repeated statutory mention of extraterritoriality, albeit
only in the context of civil suit, Justice Alito displayed the inconsistency required to avoid
judicial obliteration of RICO in cases of transnational misconduct with an American nexus.
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A most versatile omission, this failure to re-state the obvious. It is
an omission that, according to Justice Alito, would not “count” in a
prosecution of RJR-Nabisco, but one which annihilates a civil claim
against RJR-Nabisco on identical facts. Justice Alito wrote: “[W]e
separately apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to
RICO’s cause of action despite our conclusion that the presumption has been overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive prohi72
bitions.” How can this be a principled textualism, when it relies
not only on what it calls an omission, but on a conveniently variable
reading of that omission?
And so, ironically, in RJR-Nabisco, a textualist judge and his textualist majority bowed to a supposed duty to disregard the
acknowledged purposes of an act of Congress, subordinating the
statute to a late blooming judicially created hurdle that Congress
had no way of predicting. Far from engaging in statutory construction, this textualist Court elevated a supposed statutory silence to
eviscerate the actual text of an act of Congress.
Thinking about all this, we can begin to see that the textualist
argument, at least in this case, an argument supposedly in the service of deference to the legislature and separation of powers, in
fact thumbs its figurative nose at the legislature, and, through what
we might call the “gotcha” theory of statutory interpretation, works
very hard, perversely, to frustrate a legislature’s purposes.
(4) The private right to sue. But Alito’s most curious venture into
unreason in RJR-Nabisco was to associate each of the foregoing arguments with an overarching argument, that Congress should not
73
authorize private rights to sue, at least in cases of injury abroad.
(He could hardly argue that Congress could not do so.) For Justice
Alito, this was the key question posed by the case—the question
whether “RICO’s private right of action, contained in § 1964(c),
74
appl[ies] to injuries that are suffered in foreign countries.” Is
there any good reason why the answer to this question, about a
statute concededly instinct with extraterritorial intent, should be
“no?” Yet, Alito mused, “[i]t is not enough to say that a private
right of action must reach abroad because the underlying law govLess importantly, he also displayed a rather optimistic assessment of the legislative process.
No member of Congress sits down and writes a bill. The drafting of legislation is commonly
done in committee, by aides in the offices of the respective members. And no member of
Congress can read through every word in every bill. As Nancy Pelosi is said to have remarked
about the Affordable Care Act, “We have to enact it to find out what’s in it.” Dan Macguill,
Did Nancy Pelosi Say Obamacare Must be Passed to ‘Find Out What Is in It’?, SNOPES (June 22,
2017), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/pelosi-healthcare-pass-the-bill-to-see-what-is-init/.
72.
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106.
73.
Id. at 2091; 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
74.
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2119.
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erns conduct in foreign countries. Something more is need75
ed . . . .” The reader, perhaps, may be forgiven for asking,
76
“Why?”
Justice Alito went so far as to set it down that “[t]he creation of a
private right of action raises issues beyond the mere consideration
whether underlying primary conduct should be allowed or
77
not . . . .” Again, the reader will be forgiven for asking, “Why?”
What is happening here is an unprecedented inapposite transfer
of a whole sphere of argumentation from one area of law to another.
The conservative wing of the Supreme Court has long exhibited
what might justly be perceived as hostility to civil litigation alto78
gether. It is as though the Court would prefer to be a court of
criminal appeals. A special butt of the Justices, as far back as the
79
days of the late Burger Court, has been the so-called “implied”
private right to sue to enforce an act of Congress. This is not only
because an implied right, by definition, is not express. The problem for the Court has been that, if Congress has not provided a
right to sue, the litigation of a statutory violation is authorized only
80
by federal common law. And as everybody (still!) thinks he knows,
there is supposed to be something not quite right about federal
81
82
common law —some emanation, perhaps, of Erie, or of the Rules
83
of Decision Act.

75.
76.

Id. at 2108.
Cf. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2016, 65 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 5 (2017) (pointing out that in RJR Nabisco, “the Supreme Court stretched the
presumption against extraterritoriality to the farthest extreme so far, by requiring courts to
apply the presumption separately for each section of a statute”).
77.
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106.
78.
See Timothy P. Carney, Trial Lawyer Industry Tries to Buy a Democratic Majority, WASH.
EXAMINER MAG. (Oct. 22, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/triallawyer-industry-tries-to-buy-a-democratic-majority; Leslie Wayne, Trial Lawyers Pour Money into
Democrats’ Chests, N.Y. TIMES (March 23, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/23/us/
trial-lawyers-pour-money-into-democrats-chests.html.
79.
See, e.g., Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981) (holding that there can be no implied cause of action for interstate water pollution
either under the Clean Water Act or the Civil Rights Act); Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that there can be no implied cause of action under an act of Congress regulating conditions in certain caretaker institutions).
80.
It has been argued that private rights to sue make more business for the plaintiffs’
trial bar, which, through its professional association is widely believed to give monetary support to the Democratic Party. See, e.g., Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton & Maya Seny, The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. LEG. ANAL. 277, 281 (2016); Wayne, Trial Lawyers, supra note 78.
81.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1034 (1982) (referring to “the constraints imposed on federal common law by Erie and its
progeny”); Martin Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:
Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TULANE L. REV. 803, 809 (1994)
(referring to “the ban in the Rules of Decision Act . . . on the creation of federal common
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Under the influence of Justice (later Chief Justice) Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court became increasingly averse
84
to federal common-law actions to enforce acts of Congress. Judicial creation of a private right to sue to enforce an act of Congress
came to be regarded as a relic of the “heady days” when the Court
85
was willing to permit it. Increasingly, only the clear intention of
law”). For a current example, finding problematic the realist acknowledgment that judges
“make” law, see, e.g. Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 528 (2019).
The Court’s dislike of implied rights has been developing against a background of hostility to federal common law altogether. For decades the Court has spent much of its energy
in working up hostility to federal common lawmaking, as if that was not the very business the
Justices were in. Yet judge-made constraints on judicial lawmaking are judicial lawmaking
too. Moreover, the Court’s attack on federal common law ex ante, becomes, ex post, an irrational attack on the Supreme Court’s own precedents.
82.
But see Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805–52 (1989).
There is no such emanation, of course. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie
held only that identified state law must apply in all courts when it applies. Justice Brandeis
reasoned that there can be no “general” federal common law, that all law must be the law of
an identified sovereign. In state-law cases, that sovereign is the state, and under Erie, state
law (obviously) applies in all courts when it applies. Of course, in federal-law cases, that sovereign is the nation, and under the Supremacy Clause federal law (obviously) applies in all
courts when it applies.
83.
But see Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme
Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 860–75 (1989). The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652, provides, in its tautological obsolete way, “The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.” This antique traces back 240 years to Section 34 of the
First Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34 (“And be it further enacted, That the laws of the several
states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the
courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”). In practice, over the intervening 240
years, judges in all courts have been quite able to decide federal questions within their jurisdiction, and are free, if they wish, to incorporate a state rule by reference if there is no
strong national interest in the question. Similarly, over the intervening 240 years, judges in
all courts have been quite able to decide state questions within their jurisdiction, subject to
supreme federal law.
84.
The Court’s distaste for implied statutory rights to sue has culminated, latterly, in
such cases as Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017) (stating that further resort to the
Bivens cause of action is a disfavored activity). Bivens is the only general damages remedy
against a federal official for violation of the Constitution and federal laws.
85.
Corr. Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or
constitutional prohibition. As the Court points out, we have abandoned that power to invent
‘implications’ in the statutory field.”) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287
(2001)). The Court increasingly reveals a dangerous disinclination to enforce the Constitution. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) is the common-law
mechanism grounding actions against federal officials for civil rights violations, and thus is
the federal-officer analog of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which grounded suit against state
officials for civil rights violations. Bivens is thus a lynchpin of American constitutionalism
and the rule of law. One might suppose it sufficiently difficult for plaintiffs to recover damages in both kinds of civil rights actions to satisfy the Court’s distaste for them, since defendant officials, federal and state, enjoy so-called official or qualified immunity from liability for
violations of law “not clearly established.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
What is “clearly established” can seem to lie in the eyes of the beholder. See Kisela v. Hughes,
138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Congress, preferably in an express provision of a right to sue, will
make an act of Congress enforceable in a lawsuit.
In developing this body of law, the Court seems unaware of an
obvious and basic proposition of tort law: that a tort caused by violation of a statute is far more serious than a tort caused by a breach of
86
some general duty. Indeed, a tort in violation of a statute can be
held to be negligence per se, or can result in a presumption of negligence, or shift the burden of proof of negligence. At the very
87
least it can comprise competent evidence of negligence. Even at
88
federal common law, in admiralty, a statutory violation is far more
serious than some violation of a general duty. A statutory violation
causing a collision, for example, shifts an extraordinary burden to
the violating vessel to prove not only that its violation did not cause
89
the collision, but also that it could not have done so. Given the
naturally heightened importance of a tort when caused by violation
of a statute, it is astonishing that the Court continues and even
strengthens its steady assault on remedies for torts caused by violations of acts of Congress.
But the most egregiously irrational feature of Justice Alito’s
opinion in RJR-Nabisco was his treatment of RICO’s express private
right to sue. In Alito’s hands—at least if extraterritoriality is an issue—the express private right to sue fares no better than the “implied” private right to sue upon which the Court has been heaping
obloquy for so long.
It makes no sense to say that an action can be permitted only
with the greatest caution if the right to sue has not been given in a
statute expressly, and then to say that a right that has been given in
a statute expressly must also be permitted only with the greatest
caution. That about covers all the ground, as far as cases of extraterritoriality are concerned. Justice Alito was saying that even Congress, hitherto the only proper lawgiver in conservatives’ eyes, cannot, in international cases, be understood as a lawgiver at all, if it
omits to repeat that it really means that what it has enacted with
conceded extraterritorial intent is to be given extraterritorial effect.

86.
Cf. W. PAGE KEETON et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 230 (5th ed. 1984).
87.
Id. at 230 (reviewing the alternatives; concluding that negligence per se is probably
the majority rule).
88.
The inland rules of navigation, for example, are codified. See 33 U.S.C § 2071–2073
(2004).
89.
The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125, 136 (1873) (“In such a case the burden rests upon
the ship of showing not merely that her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that
it probably was not, but that it could not have been. Such a rule is necessary to enforce obedience to the mandate of the statute.”).
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But Justice Alito here became even more sweeping in his language, and thus even more irrational. His broadened language
could be read to disapprove of new classes of civil litigation altogether. Quoting language from an earlier case, Justice Alito wrote,
“‘The creation of a private right of action raises issues beyond the
mere consideration whether underlying primary conduct should
be allowed or not, entailing, for example, a decision to permit enforcement without the check imposed by prosecutorial discre90
tion.’”
Justice Alito seems here to be arguing, in effect, that Congress
meant to discourage altogether the use of the civil remedy that
Congress itself enacted.
Alito’s attempt to justify this bit of unreason only led him further
down the rabbit hole. He did not attempt to explain why attorneys
(who labor under a need to win cases to meet payroll and pay
overhead—not to mention a need not to violate Rule 11) are not
an effective “check” on private litigation. He also omitted to mention that a prosecutor’s discretionary decision not to prosecute is
unreviewable, so that in the absence of a private right to sue there
may be no access to justice at all for victims of criminal activity violating an act of Congress. And if he intended this part of his opinion to have to do exclusively with international cases, I should have
thought the State Department to be more effective than local U.S.
Attorneys in dealing with, or at least in informing courts of, foreign
relations issues, if only because State Department officials are un91
der no pressure to secure convictions.
(5) The law to be applied. An extraordinary rule was discovered
and set out with approval by Justice Alito in RJR-Nabisco. He wrote,

90.
RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016) (quoting Sosa v.
Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)).
91.
It is part of the complexity of the issues raised by RJR Nabisco that the European
Community probably had few avenues for relief abroad. After the decision in RJR Nabisco,
the question arises whether the individual countries involved, or the European Union itself,
was competent to do anything about the linked problems of terror, narcotics, and tobacco
glimpsed in the RJR Nabisco litigation. See Anatole Abaquesne de Parfourus, “Breaking
Through the Foul and Ugly Mists of Vapours”—Regulation of Alternative Tobacco and Related Products by the New TPD and Exercise of EU Competence, 19 GERMAN L.J. 1291 (2018). It is widely
noted that civil litigation in European countries, unlike criminal prosecution, can be inexpedient and even unavailable. The courts often are not like common-law courts. Earlier cases can appear as unexplained bald statements of decision. Contingency fees are often considered unethical, and the winner’s attorney fees tend to get shifted to the loser, thus
impeding the kind of court access individuals enjoy in the United States. Moreover, courts
may not have powers to handle class or other complex actions, or to provide court orders. A
few European nations, inspired by our Supreme Court, have instituted constitutional courts,
but these can suffer from some of the same sorts of impediments as do other courts in European countries, and have proved controversial. See Andrea Pin, The Transnational Drivers
of Populist Backlash in Europe: The Role of Courts, 20 GERMAN L.J. 225 (2019) (arguing that the
trend toward constitutionalism has produced a populist backlash in Europe).
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“Respondents’ argument [that a nonresident traditionally can sue
in our courts on foreign injuries] might have force if they sought
to sue RJR for violations of their own laws and to invoke federal di92
versity jurisdiction as a basis for proceeding in U.S. courts.” This
view, if established, would be a rule that in a transnational case
brought by a nonresident, the law of the plaintiff’s home country
applies, But even if the laws of all the member states of the European Union explicitly provided that, in cases of statutory tort there
could be no recovery for economic harms, that defense could have
no rational application to an American tobacco company sued
here. France’s local defenses exist to protect French defendants.
France has no interest at all in extending its laws to protect all the
companies in the world in all the courts in the world from the consequences of their statutory torts. We are talking about the rational
93
application of law. Once again, we can see defensive argument
making scant sense when proffered in our configuration of cases.
(6) The “point” of Civil RICO. We have seen that, having acknowledged that RICO was instinct with extraterritorial intent, Justice
Alito gave little or no value to that insight. Perhaps Chief Justice
Roberts might have preferred Justice Alito to have pitched his argument on the “focus” of the law. Consider its anti-terror provisions enacted in the wake of 9/11. The 9/11 attack on the United
States was a serious foreign attack on our home country. There was
damage to the Pentagon as well as to New York skyscrapers and
surrounding structures. There were some 3,000 dead. In effect, this
was the first aerial bombardment of the United States by a foreign
force, deploying four planes. Pitilessly, those were four passenger
planes. (What distinguishes terrorism from freedom fighting, revolution, or war is the terrorists’ deliberate and indiscriminate violence against civilians.) The foreign force that struck us that day
was not a foreign nation but rather a foreign criminal organization
of Islamic terrorists. The Patriot Act, and its amendments to RICO,
were part of Congress’s response to this.
The “focus” of the Patriot Act might be supposed, by a territorialist Court, to be the various places in this country comprising the
loci delicti on September 11, 2001: The World Trade Center and
environs in New York, or the Pentagon in Virginia, or a field in
Pennsylvania where the heroes of flight 93, with their quiet “Let’s
roll,” went to their deaths bringing down one of the hijacked
planes. That plane is now widely believed to have been headed toward the Capitol, in contemplation of murder of the Senators and

92.
93.

RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct., at 2109.
On the essentially local quality of legal defenses, see infra Part III-A(3).
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members of the House, with the Constitution in the rotunda burning. Or, more comprehensively, the locus delicti might be the United States itself. But the purpose of RICO is not to deal with hijacked planes, murdered thousands, destroyed skyscrapers, a gutgutted financial district, or threats to our seat of government and
its grand traditions, but rather to deal with criminal organizations
and their crimes—with rackets and racketeering.
In the context of the Patriot Act, this means, inter alia, a focus on
organized money-laundering in support of Islamic terrorism. In
the context of RICO, this means the conduct of organized criminal
activity—that is, racketeering. As Justice Alito acknowledged at the
very outset of his opinion in RJR-Nabisco, “RICO is founded on the
94
concept of racketeering activity.” Obviously a purpose of “Civil”
RICO is to bring the prohibitions of RICO home to offending
companies in their bank accounts and stock prices, and in their
salaries and bonuses for executives. RICO, in sum, is “focused” on
organized racketeers and their rackets, wherever the injuries consequent on those rackets may occur. And that focus is extended to
the list of predicate violations that can ground prosecutions—and
95
can also ground actions brought under Civil RICO —in the Patriot Act’s additions of the offenses of money-laundering abroad and
support of terrorism.
Civil RICO is regulatory in a manner complementary to RICO—
it is about deterrence of rackets. Again, dollars are different from
prison terms, but unquestionably dollars add to deterrence in this
context. Dollar damages, trebled, will affect predator companies
and their shareholders, and can drive predator companies into
96
bankruptcy, affecting those who have financed or supplied them
as well.
An American defendant company, having committed tortious
violations of an act of Congress, is well within the regulatory con97
cerns of the United States, wherever it commits those acts. Our
courts have full power to remediate the torts caused by an American company’s violation of an act of Congress. In the configuration
of cases we are examining, a foreign place of injury has no concerns to the contrary. It is the very lack of foreign interest in defeating claims of foreign injury that makes nonsense of defenses in
cases in our configuration.
94.
RJR Nabisco, 366 S. Ct., at 2096.
95.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
96.
Individuals violating criminal RICO can be imprisoned up to twenty years. Their
fines are capped at $250,000. Companies violating criminal RICO can be fined twice the
gross losses attributable to the violation. 28 U.S.C. § 1963.
97.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 57, at § xv (correctly explaining that the location of regulated conduct is immaterial).
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Today’s task in interpretation of law, habitual with lawyers and
judges, is text-bound. We tend to subordinate purposive reasoning
to text. Yet it is not possible to determine the scope of any rule
without knowing the reason for the rule; its telos, its point. If the
purpose of Congress in RICO is to deter and punish racketeers,
that legislation applies to racketeers. It applies, at a minimum to all
racketeers here, and to American racketeers everywhere. Purposive
reasoning would suggest that if courts must apply any presumption
in divining the intentions of a legislature, that presumption should
accommodate the desired functioning of the legislation, not defeat
it.
It was the great American legal realist, Karl Llewellyn, who
pointed out that for every beloved old canon of construction one
98
could propose an equally convincing but opposite one. Unfortunately, Llewellyn’s famous list of twenty-eight examples does not
include a presumption against extraterritorial application of statutory law. Had it done so, it might then have included an equal and
opposite presumption, something like this: “In the silence of a
statute, territorial limits are not to be judicially inferred to block
the force of the enactment within the rational scope of its purposes
and the legislative power.”
I am confident in this suggestion, and also in its superiority to
the Court’s presumption, because, as we have been reminded,
Llewellyn also pointed out in the same article that law cannot be
99
interpreted rationally without regard to its purposes.
*****
The Court in RJR-Nabisco fell into unreason when it refused to
enforce an act of Congress without a convincing reason for such
disregard. It was irrational to contend that our foreign relations
with Europe would be negatively affected by allowing Europe to try
to prove its case. There was no convincing textual reason to disregard the conceded extraterritorial reach of RICO. There was no
reason to disapprove a civil action provided by Congress on the
98.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VANDERBILT L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (containing twin
tables of twenty-eight canons and their opposites). For an interesting study of the Roberts
Court’s love affair with canons of construction, see Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and
Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade,
117 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2018). For the importance of Erie beyond its focus on the common
law, see Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of
Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013); Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due
Process and Lawmaking Power, supra note 56.
99.
Llewellyn, supra note 98, at 400; see Heydon’s Case (1584), 76 Eng. Rep. 637; 3 Co.
Rep. 7 (holding that, in construing legislation, courts must consider the “mischief” that the
statute was intended to correct).

FALL 2019]

Age of Unreason

29

ground that the Court likes prosecutions better. There was scant
sense in the Court’s view that foreign plaintiffs must be satisfied
with their own countries’ laws even when their own countries have
no objection to ours. It is true that treble damages are heavy, no
doubt, but that was the balance struck by Congress between low actual damages and freewheeling punitive damages. The Court took
it upon itself to upend an act of Congress for no reason.
In short, there was no justification for the Court’s failure to enforce the Act. Justice Alito’s unseemly struggle for reason in an attempt to frustrate the intentions of Congress in a matter of vital national policy is an embarrassment. But such unreason is inevitable
in the configuration of cases of which RJR-Nabisco is representative.
It would appear that a court is under obligation, reflected in the
oath of office, to give access to the claims of non-residents seeking
to instantiate the actual regulatory policies of the sovereign at the
place of trial, and, somewhat surprisingly, cannot escape the obligation on any rational basis. That is something that has not been
suspected, much less understood.
D. The Regulatory Interests of the United States
This paper has proceeded from the tacit premise that the degree
of national commitment to good conduct on the part of our companies and their executives is a potent determinant of the degree
of the world’s confidence in our trade relations, business dealings,
and exports. The rule of law—our own law as enacted by Congress,
our own regulations thereunder, and the federal common law the
Supreme Court supplies—is part of our national character in others’ eyes, a component of our soft power, if you will. Lax, permissive laws, in this view, to the extent they license substandard conduct by our companies and their executives, are injurious, and not
only to our reputation. Because of the harm to our reputation they
are injurious to our foreign markets, thus to our international
commerce, and thus to our economy. Strong regulatory law—law
furthering safety, reliability, and freedom from corrupt or predatory practices—law extending to the whole of the nation’s power
over international commerce, over our entire sphere of interest
and desired influence in our globalized, interconnected world—
self-evidently advances our national interests, shared with other nations, in trade, prosperity, and good relations.
Because the conduct of our national companies and their representatives engages these national interests wherever they act with
consequences abroad, it becomes necessary that American businesses and their officers and agents act in accordance with Ameri-
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can law wherever they act, wherever their actions have effect. Of
course, our companies must also comply with the law in force
wherever they act—but only when compliance would not require
violation of our own law. If an American company abroad cannot
act in compliance with local law without violating ours, that company, in my view, should not be doing business in that country.
Nothing should diminish an American company’s obligation to
conform its conduct to the laws of the United States.
Thus, it becomes important that American law require good
conduct without territorial or other arbitrary limits. Unwritten limits on written remedies simply invite misconduct, with damage to
the interests of the United States. As for a court’s solicitude toward
a struggling local enterprise, there is no virtue in protecting any
enterprise from responsibility for wrongdoing—no advantage to
the company or the polity in allowing a statutory tort to go unremedied. If need be, the company can seek the protections of bank100
ruptcy. Acts of Congress are law which every court in this country
is sworn to uphold.
To be sure, both conservatives and liberals can see a need to relieve enterprise of undue regulatory burdens. Deregulation commends itself when regulation requires massive paperwork, for example, without substantial benefit to anyone. But deregulation by
irrational judicial fiat does not commend itself. Executives—and
lawyers and politicians as well—those who are ideologically committed to the goal of deregulation—might consider that sound
regulation can cartelize an industry, making affordable the cost of
doing better business by diminishing or eliminating the price
competition of companies doing shoddy business. It can require
honest business from all, freeing all from dishonest competition.
In this way, national reputational interests can be advanced, and
our well-regulated companies can share in this advantage.
What has been said here underscores that the significant contacts between a sovereign and its regulated company, when in the
courts of the regulating sovereign, are contacts between the regulating sovereign itself and the conduct of the regulated company.
The location of injury resulting from that conduct is, of course, a
matter of concern to courts at the place of injury. But the place of
injury is of concern to the courts of the regulatory state only when
the conduct-regulating state seeks to measure actual economic
101
damages for the injuries caused by the prohibited conduct.

100.
101.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1963.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text on economic damages.
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*****
We can now see how unreason becomes a predictable feature of
litigation in the configuration of cases seen in RJR-Nabisco. In that
litigation, the Roberts Court put itself in the position of protecting
a predatory company from having to defend a lawsuit. It is not
clear that the Community could have made out its case; the question we are considering, rather, is one of access. Here, access was
denied on the novel thinking that even expressly-authorized lawsuits should be disapproved in favor of prosecutions, at least in
cases in which the plaintiff is foreign. The Court stepped in, took a
hand, and embarked on an unconvincing struggle in the service of
neutering an act of Congress, with the consequence of insulating
an American criminal enterprise from exposure to liability at the
suit of foreign friends.
This was an award of judgment to the home company without
the support of a convincing reason. With this, the Supreme Court
gave its decision every appearance of a naked preference for the
home party. The little difficulty of apparent want of neutrality thus
reared its head, rendering the decision in RJR-Nabisco arbitrary and
102
indeed unconstitutional as a matter of due process —whether or
not the Supreme Court will ever see this.
Today, RJR is once more a stripped-down North Carolina company, Reynolds America, in its original business of supplying the
dwindling market for Camel cigarettes. Recently it has formed R. J.
Reynolds Vapor Company and has put itself in the business of de103
104
veloping another addictive—and dangerous —tobacco product.
It is a subsidiary of a subsidiary that is wholly owned by a British
105
holding company, British American Tobacco, P.L.C.
II. AN INTERSTATE CASE: ROWE V. HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE
106

Although Rowe v. Hoffmann–La Roche is a choice-of-law case,
and RJR-Nabisco is not, Rowe is analogous to RJR-Nabisco in that, in
102.
See Caperton, 556 U.S., 868 (2009).
103.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and state agencies have reported
2,051 lung injury cases and 40 deaths linked to vaping. Jonathan Corum, Vaping Illness Trackhttps://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/health/vaping-illnessTIMES,
er,
N.Y.
tracker.html (last updated Nov. 15, 2019).
104.
See RJREYNOLDS VAPOR COMPANY, https://www.rjrvapor.com (last visited Nov. 16,
2019).
105.
See BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO, http://www.bat.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
106.
Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 917 A.2d 767 (N.J. 2007). For earlier comment on
Rowe, including mine, see, e.g., Louise Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1999 (2015); Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National
Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2008); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
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both cases, a nonresident sues a defendant company at the defendant’s home; access to the law at the place of trial is withheld;
and there is a surprising inadequacy of reason to explain the result.
A. A Troubled History
Hoffmann-La Roche, an American subsidiary of a Swiss holding
company, is a major manufacturer of pharmaceuticals. The company has borne a substantial burden of litigation over the sufficiency of its warnings of the dangerous side effects of its once107
popular acne medication, Accutane.
Accutane is not a topical ointment; it is a drug taken internally.
Its side effects include substantial risks of deep depression, attempted suicide, and suicide. The company’s original warnings
were compliant with the regulations of the federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). But the company appears to have taken a
108
deliberate decision not to update its warnings as claims of injury
109
and death mounted.
Like RJR-Nabisco, Hoffmann-La Roche sought salvation from its
litigation troubles and consequent financial difficulties in spin-offs
and mergers. There was an attempt to fix prices in international
American Courts in 2007: Twenty-First Annual Survey, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (2008); see generally
William A. Dreier, Liability for Drug Advertising, Warnings, and Frauds, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 615
(2006).
107.
Accutane was discontinued in 2009. However, it remains available in its generic
form, isotretinoin, and is prescribed as a drug of last resort. Hoffmannn-La Roche has also
been in litigation for years over other popular but dangerous drugs, notably Risperdal, prescribed for certain psychological disorders, but which allegedly can cause men to grow
breasts. See Risperdal, DRUG DANGERS, https://www.drugdangers.com/risperdal/ (last visited
Sept. 8, 2019).
108.
See Alliance for Human Research Protection, Hoffman LaRoche Rebuffed Call to Monitor Accutane Users – USA Today, USA TODAY (Dec. 7, 2004), https://ahrp.org/hoffmanlaroche-rebuffed-call-to-monitor-accutane-users-usa-today/ (reviewing an investigative report
that “affirms the indispensable role of litigation in bringing the facts about adverse drug
effects to public knowledge. Lawsuits against Hoffmann-La Roche, manufacturer of the acne
drug, Accutane, uncovered internal company memos by Roche’s safety experts who recommended changing the US label to reflect the evidence that Accutane ‘probably caused’ depression and other psychiatric illnesses in some patients.”).
109.
See Diane K. Wysowski, et al., Depression and Suicide in Patients Treated with Isotretinoin,
344 N. ENGL. J. MED. 460 (Feb. 8, 2001) (stating that “[b]etween 1982 and May 2000, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) received reports of 431 cases of depression, suicidal
ideation, suicide attempts, or suicide in U.S. patients treated with isotretinoin (Accutane,
Hoffmann–La Roche), which is indicated for the treatment of severe nodular acne. There
were 37 patients who committed suicide, 24 of them while using isotretinoin and 13 after
ceasing to use it. Of these patients, 31 (84 percent) were male, and their median age was 17
years (range, 13 to 32).”).
For information on Accutane suicides in the United Kingdom, see Tracie Egan Morrissey, Accutane to Be Reviewed in UK After Series of Suicides, JEZEBEL (Apr. 29, 2014),
https://jezebel.com/accutane-to-be-reviewed-in-uk-after-series-of-suicides-1569215503.
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markets; the Justice Department fined the company a half billion
110
dollars in that scandal.
111
In the case that would become Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche, the
back-story begins up in Michigan, when Robert Rowe, at the time a
sixteen-year-old lad with a stubborn case of acne, went to a doctor
and received a prescription for Accutane. Some three months after
he stopped taking the medicine a mysterious deep depression fell
112
upon the boy, and he drove his car into a house in an attempt to
commit suicide. He sustained serious injuries. (I cannot say that I
believe this story, but the case arose on review of a successful motion to dismiss, and we must take the allegations of the plausible
complaint as true.)
Several years after these events, Rowe discovered that depression
and suicide were side effects of Accutane. He sued. The gravamen
of his products liability suit was the failure of the defendant Hoffmann-La Roche to warn of the serious side effects of Accutane,
specifically the risk of suicidal depression.
Robert Rowe, being a resident of Michigan, might have sued the
company there. Personal jurisdiction could be had under Michi113
gan’s long-arm statute. But it is hard to say that in suing in New
Jersey Rowe was forum shopping in some pejorative sense, since
New Jersey was a principal place of the company’s business in the
United States. However, Rowe undoubtedly was counting on secur114
ing the benefit of New Jersey law. He would certainly lose his case
if it were tried under the law of his home state, Michigan.
B. A Problematic Presumption
Michigan’s warning requirements for dangerous pharmaceuticals could conceivably be read as codifying needed basic regulation
of the conduct of its own makers of pharmaceuticals, and might
have been thought to provide law for Robert Rowe’s case. But
Michigan draws a line that makes the overriding effect of its law
protective of its resident pharmaceutical companies. When Rowe
first brought his case, Michigan was also a principal place of busi-

110.
See Criminal Cartel/Enforcement Status Reports, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (March 28,
2001), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/criminal-cartel-enforcement-status-reports.
111.
Rowe, 917 A.2d 767, 767 (N.J. 2007).
112.
See Wysowski, Depression and Suicide, supra note 109, on post-Accutane injuries. These
evidently account for roughly a third of cases.
113.
See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.705(2).
114.
Cf. Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 463–
64 (1982) (pointing out that the Supreme Court has set up a forum-shopping system, and
offering reasons why).
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ness of Pfizer, the giant pharmaceuticals house, and scores of other
pharmaceutical and medical device companies, clustered particu115
larly around Michigan’s great university at Ann Arbor. Michigan
had every incentive to protect its pharmaceuticals industry from liabilities that in its view might be excessive.
To be sure, Michigan law requires that drug makers in Michigan
conform to the warning requirements imposed by the federal Food
116
and Drug Administration. Courts tend to apply a presumption of
sufficiency to warnings that conform to FDA regulations. Michigan
achieves its protective but reasonable goal by making this presump117
tion conclusive. This Michigan statute would certainly have defeated Rowe’s case if he had filed it in Michigan, because Hoffmann-LaRoche’s warnings had fully complied with FDA
regulations at the time Accutane went on the market.
New Jersey’s regulation of drug warnings, on the other hand, is
more stringent than the FDA’s. The relevant New Jersey statute also presumes the adequacy of FDA-compliant warnings, but makes
118
the presumption rebuttable. Under New Jersey case law, the presumption can be rebutted by a failure to update warnings in light
119
of post-approval experience. However, mere negligence in failure
to update warnings is not enough to rebut the presumption. There
must be a knowing failure to update, if significant unwarned risks
emerge in medical reports and litigation. If, in the face of mounting evidence of a dangerous side effect, there is reckless disregard
or deliberate concealment—if, in other words, the case ordinarily
would warrant punitive damages—the presumption of sufficiency
120
of the warnings is rebutted. Nevertheless, although New Jersey
law requires a showing that punitive damages would be appropri121
ate, New Jersey law precludes awards of punitive damages.

115.
For a list of Michigan pharmaceuticals and medical-device firms after Pfizer’s departure from Michigan, see Michigan Biotech, Pharmaceutical & Life Sciences Companies,
BIOPHARMGUY, https://biopharmguy.com/links/state-mi-all-geo.php (last visited Sept. 8,
2019); see also Jay Greene, Life after Pfizer: A Decade Later, Michigan Pharmaceutical Companies
Have Found Paths to Growth, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (MAY 14, 2017, 8:00 AM),
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20170514/NEWS/170519924/life-after-pfizer-adecade-later-michigan-pharmaceutical-companies.
116.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(5) (2006).
117.
Id. In other states, compliance with inadequate or minimal regulations might not
be conclusive as to due care, but would be treated as competent evidence of due care. See,
e.g., J.C. v. Pfizer, 814 S.E.2d 234 (W.Va. 2018). For a proposed change in Michigan’s presumption which would make it rebuttable, see infra note 136 and accompanying text.
118.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2018).
119.
Id.
120.
See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1259 (N.J. 1999) (“[A]bsent deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects, compliance with FDA standards should be virtually dispositive” of a failure-to-warn claim.”).
121.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-5 (West 2018).
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Robert Rowe was therefore seeking compensatory damages only.
He argued that, if Hoffmann-La Roche’s warnings had been upgraded to reveal the more serious risks of Accutane as they became
apparent, he would not have used Accutane. His injuries, which
were severe, would have been prevented. One suspects that few
purchasers do read the long multilingual lists of dire side effects in
small print on thin paper folded and inserted into a box. But in
thinking about Rowe’s case we must assume that if warnings accurately disclosing the risks of Accutane had been available, Robert
Rowe would have read them and would not have used the drug.
The New Jersey trial court ruled that Michigan law applied and
granted the manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment. After
all, Michigan was the place of injury, and, besides, it seemed reasonable to apply Michigan law to a resident of Michigan, who purchased a drug in Michigan with a prescription furnished by a Michigan doctor. However, on the facts of Rowe, the apparently “reason“reasonable” choice of Michigan law would have been irrational.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed on
122
this ground.
Using a basic interest analysis, the Appellate Division, by Judge
Wecker, held, correctly, that Michigan’s defendant-protecting
standard had no rational application in Rowe’s case, since there
was no Michigan defendant in the case to protect. Judge Wecker
123
then correctly identified New Jersey’s interest as regulatory. He
saw that New Jersey had an interest in providing a more patientprotective standard to govern cases of a defendant drug company’s
knowing or reckless failure to update its warnings as evidence of
danger emerged. Judge Wecker could rely, in support of this think124
ing, on an earlier case in New Jersey’s Supreme Court. Thus, New
Jersey law applied.
There was a dissent in the Appellate Division. Among other
things, the dissent identified an interest in New Jersey’s not becom125
ing a magnet forum. This concern, although speculative and disconnected from the pleadings, was to surface again in the state’s
Supreme Court. Given the rather nice work in the Appellate Divi-

122.
Rowe v. Hoffman La-Roche, Inc., 383 N.J. Super. 442 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
123.
For excellent discussions of regulatory governmental interests, see Michael S. Green,
The Return of the Unprovided-For Case, 51 GA. L. REV. 763 (2017) (generally treating tort law as
reflecting regulatory policies, whether compensatory or deterrent); Neuman, Extraterritoriality, supra note 28 (exploring the national interest of the United States in regulating the conduct of its own officials, with a survey of cases).
124.
Rowe, 383 N.J. Super. at 453 (citing Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106 (N.J.
1996)).
125.
Id. at 465 (avoiding the phrase “magnet forum;” instead using the term “haven,”
more appropriately used to describe states the courts of which would shield defendants).
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sion, it was something of a shock when the state’s Supreme Court
126
reversed, holding that Robert Rowe’s case must be dismissed.
C. The Struggle for Reason
(1) An unconvincing construction. The New Jersey high court’s
127
opinion in Rowe, by Judge LeFelt, opened by re-classifying Rowe,
not implausibly, as a no-conflict case. Judge LeFelt reasoned that
both New Jersey and Michigan require warnings of dangerous side
effects in the labeling of pharmaceuticals. Both states seek to protect their residents. The difference, then, was one of degree only.
It was a minor difference in the strength of the presumption of sufficiency of the FDA requirements; the two statutes were “substan128
tially congruent.”
This seemingly plausible argument loses force when we recall
the actual workings of the Michigan statute. As we have seen, there
was no way to construe Michigan law as simply protective of Michigan patients who might purchase pharmaceutical products manufactured out of state. That vague speculation should have been
forestalled by the fact that Michigan’s conclusive presumption
129
clearly insulated FDA-compliant drug companies from liability.
Michigan’s immunity rule could rationally comprise only a defense, and a defense only for Michigan drug companies; Michigan
had no interest in protecting every other state’s drug companies—
as the Appellate Division had perceived.
Judge LeFelt properly abandoned this line of reasoning but,
strangely, did not delete it. He seems to have concluded, after a review of earlier cases, that his “no-conflict” classification could be
made to square with New Jersey precedent only if he were prepared to apply New Jersey law and to let Rowe’s case go forward.
Instead, he wound up ruling that Rowe was a “true conflict” after
all, since the laws differed and the difference would affect the out130
come. This definition of a “true conflict” was unhelpful. It would
also describe a “false conflict” (a case in which only one state has a
governmental interest, but the laws differ and the outcome would
differ depending on which state’s law applied). It would also describe an unprovided case (a case in which neither state has a gov-

126.
Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, 917 A.2d 767 (N.J. 2007).
127.
Id.
128.
Id. at 774.
129.
See, e.g., M.M. v. Pfizer, Inc., 806 S.E.2d 800 (W.Va. 2017) (applying Michigan’s failure-to-warn statute as a complete defense).
130.
Id. at 775.
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ernmental interest, but the laws differ and the outcome would de131
pend on which was applied).
Judge LeFelt proceeded to identify what he thought to be the
respective states’ interests. He was correct that New Jersey’s governmental interest in the case was regulatory (this had been held
in the same earlier New Jersey case on which the court below had
132
relied). But he fell again into unreason when he tried to identify
Michigan’s interest in its conclusive presumption of adequacy as an
interest in making prescription drugs more affordable to Michigan’s
133
citizens.
This is a poignant example of the souring of defensive argument
in cases configured as Rowe was. Carried to the extreme, Judge
LeFelt’s affordability argument would lead to the conclusion that
there is a legitimate governmental interest in deleting the law of
products liability altogether, on the theory that eliminating the expense of defending the lawsuits would make products more affordable. The reality is that nobody wants to make dangerous products
more affordable. Why would Michigan want to make more available to its residents a life-threatening drug of last resort like Accutane, particularly when the manufacturer has knowingly obscured
the news that the drug could kill them?
Then, too, it is hardly obvious that adding a line to the existing
warnings would make a drug more expensive. On the contrary,
drugs are less expensive the fewer wrongful death lawsuits are
brought, extracting dollars from the maker.
(2) The scales of injustice. Judge LeFelt went on to weigh this nonexistent Michigan interest in the affordability of killer drugs
against New Jersey’s regulatory interest. The weighing of governmental interests is a process—however popular—that the Supreme
Court of the United States has wisely disapproved in its own inter134
state conflicts cases, and one in which analysts of my stripe would
also prefer not to indulge. The United States Supreme Court has
been quite correct in its perception that a court must remain free

131.
These categories will be further defined and discussed below. The taxonomy is addressed in Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra note 106, and is
derived from Brainerd Currie’s writings on conflict of laws collected in BRAINERD CURRIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
132.
See Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106 (N.J. 1996).
133.
Rowe, 917 A.2d, at 774.
134.
See Franchise Tax Bd. of Calif. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 496 (2003) (“[W]e abandoned
the balancing-of-interests approach to conflicts of law under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. We have recognized, instead, that ‘it is frequently the case under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause that a court can lawfully apply either the law of one State or the contrary law
of another.’ We thus have held that a State need not ‘substitute the statutes of other states
for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.’”) (citations omitted).
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to apply its own law and policies, however weighty some other polity’s interests might be in the matter. But with this dubious “weighing,” Judge LeFelt was able to conclude that Michigan law—which
we have seen to be without rational application in Rowe’s case—
135
was the only appropriate law for it.
(3) On forum shopping. We have seen that a significant feature of
Judge LeFelt’s opinion was his well-expressed feeling that there was
something abusive about a nonresident’s using New Jersey courts.
Judges tend to see actions by nonresidents as forum shopping and
tend to see forum shopping as an evil. But this reaction seems odd
in a case like Rowe, in which the plaintiff has come to the very place
where the defendant company has its principal place of business,
arguably the most convenient and appropriate place of trial against
any company, from the company’s own perspective.
In Rowe, one might conclude that, in dismissing the case of a forum-shopping plaintiff, Rowe was a clear case of discrimination
against the nonresident. But in Judge LeFelt’s view, a Michigan individual had come to New Jersey with his late-blooming Michigan
miseries to sue a valued local enterprise. Judge LeFelt candidly
wrote,
To allow a life-long Michigan resident who received an
FDA-approved drug in Michigan and alleges injuries sustained in Michigan to by-pass his own state’s law and obtain
compensation for his injuries in this State’s courts completely undercuts Michigan’s interests, while overvaluing
our true interest in this litigation. In this instance, where
the challenged drug was approved by the FDA and suit was
brought by an out-of-state plaintiff who has no cause of action in his home state, this State’s interest in ensuring that
our corporations are deterred from producing unsafe
136
products . . . must yield. . . .

135.
Two of the judges dissented in part. Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 917 A.2d 776,
776 (N.J. 2007) (Stern, J. dissenting). They urged delay and pointed out that a bill had
passed the Michigan House, H.B. 4044-4045. 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2007), which if
adopted, would repeal Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(5), and enact a rebuttable presumption that products are safe if they are subject to, and comply with, pertinent government
safety standards. But the Court thought it imprudent to delay, given the vagaries of legislative action.
136.
Rowe, 917 A.2d at 778. For an amusing view of the Michigan “diaspora” of plaintiffs
seeking to avoid Michigan’s conclusive presumption of adequacy, see Eric Alexander, Michi(Dec. 15, 2017),
gan
Strikes
Back
in
Pennsylvania,
DRUG & DEVICE L.
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2017/12/michigan-strikes-back-inpennsylvania.html (discussing the phenomenon of the “tourism” of the “Michigan Diaspora”); see also Eric Alexander, Direct-Filed MDL Case on Thin Ice for Personal Jurisdiction, DRUG &
DEVICE L., https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/author/ealexander (last visited Oct. 29,
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Note here the inadvertently revelatory self-contradicting admission that Michigan’s interest was defendant-protecting, after all.
Apparently, the holding in Rowe was less an application of Michigan law than an expression of the New Jersey judges’ objections to
137
being made use of. In 2018 the New Jersey high court clearly repudiated Rowe on this point, ruling that choices of law must not be
138
based on animus to nonresidents.
Judicial distaste for forum shopping, endemic as it is, is forgetful
of the fact that the plaintiff’s choice of forum is not only in the
139
long tradition of the common law in this country, but also is reflected in the traditional understandings of freedom and federalism that underlie the promise of interstate Privileges and Immunities guaranteed by Article IV, and in particular, traditional
understandings of interstate access to courts, a vital part of that
140
promise. Moreover, notwithstanding that the forum shopping
plaintiff gains the advantage of favorable forum law, all that that
plaintiff actually gets, in most instances, is a chance to prove its
case.
141
I will return to this forum shopping issue shortly.
(4) By what authority? We have seen that the New Jersey high
court was unable to find a convincing reason for departing from
New Jersey’s own law. Yet it nevertheless applied Michigan law and
threw the case out. Even if Michigan’s statutory defense could have
been applied rationally in Rowe, a question would still be raised,
here as in RJR-Nabisco: By what authority does a court disregard its
own sovereign’s applicable and constitutional law?

2019). The author praises Pennsylvania for a recent change. Pennsylvania now will irrationally apply the law of an uninterested state, Michigan, to defeat the cases of Michigan “tourists” seeking better law than they can get at home. The author praises those federal courts
which have done the same. I note that federal courts are required to apply the law that the
plaintiff’s chosen forum state “would” apply. Cf. Klaxon v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
137.
For the realist argument that choices of foreign (non-forum) law should be understood as forum law, since they reflect the forum judiciary’s actual preferences, see infra Part
III-A.
138.
See In re Accutane Litigation, 194 A.3d 503, 522 (N.J 2018) (on certified questions,
ruling that a court should not apply its choice-of-law principles in a way that discriminates
against nonresidents).
139.
On the deference due a plaintiff’s choice of forum, see Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612 (1964) (holding in a transferred case that the law of the transferor court governs at
the transferee court, including the transferor court’s choice-of-law rules). For current discussion of the deference due the plaintiff’s choice of forum in a state’s written and common
law, see Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp. v. Kerrigan, 174 A.3d 351 (Md. 2017).
140.
On the right of access to courts as emanating from the Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause, see Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907);
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1898).
141.
On the problem of “the magnet forum,” see infra Part III-A, III-C(2).
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In failing to enforce its own statute, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Rowe defeated the modest regulatory intentions of New
Jersey’s own legislature while advancing no interest of its sister
state. Indeed, if Rowe’s home state of Michigan can be said to have
had any interest at all in Rowe’s case, it might have been a certain
warm glow of expectation that its resident would bring home a lit142
tle money.
Even if Rowe had been a true conflict—even if Michigan could
have had any legitimate governmental interest in preventing its resident, Robert Rowe, from recovering for his injuries in a state that
143
would allow recovery —that would not have been reason enough
for the New Jersey high court to avoid the obligation of applying its
own regulatory law against its own company within the scope of the
regulation, as the Appellate Division saw. The presumption of sufficiency of FDA-compliant warnings having been rebutted in
Rowe’s case, Rowe was entitled to have his case heard. There was
no need to look to Michigan law.
One often hears of “comity” in a two-sovereign litigation. But
comity certainly ought not to be extended to the uninterested state
144
in a false conflict case. Indeed, I would argue that comity need
not (and, I would argue, ought not) extend even to an interested

142.
On recoveries as sparing innocent dependents and heirs, taxpayers, medical services, and charitable resources, see infra note 208.
143.
For a startling example of this sort of unreason, see, e.g., Laugelle v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., No. 10C–12–054, 2013 WL 5460164 (Del. Super. 2013) (in a wrongful death
suit, the defendant’s corporate home state applying the law of the plaintiffs’ home state,
Massachusetts, as place of the grieving family’s mental anguish, to deny recovery for mental
anguish). The Delaware Court took the position that Massachusetts, the widow’s home state,
was the place of most significant contact with the widow’s grief, and therefore Massachusetts
law applied. But Massachusetts had no interest in protecting Delaware corporations or Texas
manufacturers from damages for grief, and Delaware had a regulatory interest in allowing
damages for grief as against a Delaware corporation found to be at fault in the death of a
helicopter pilot. A counterargument was available, that, as place of incorporation only, Delaware’s only governmental interest in Bell Helicopter was in its corporate governance.
Laugelle probably should have been resolved by Delaware law, in the bare justice-furnishing
interest of the forum. See infra Part III-D(3). Another solution would have been a decision
henceforth to apply Delaware’s substantive rules of decision when a Delaware corporation
with no other contact with Delaware than as place of incorporation is sued in Delaware for a
tort. In its footnote 19, the Laugelle court explains that the plaintiffs declined to rely on Texas law. It appears that economic loss was a significant part of the damages claimed, and under Texas law, when so claimed, economic damages are held to be exclusive.
144.
In the language of governmental interest analysis in choice-of-law theory, a false
conflict is a case in which there is only one interested state—that is, only one state with an
interest in having its law applied to a particular issue. In such cases a court obviously should
apply the law of the only interested state to that issue. These sorts of analyses were the contribution of Brainerd Currie. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS,
supra note 131, including, on page 77, one of the most influential law-review articles in
American legal history, his Married Women’s Contracts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958). For a
general exegesis see Louise Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra
note 106.
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non-forum state in a true conflict case. What matters is the forum’s own law and policy.
It is true that New Jersey’s regulatory law would benefit not only
New Jersey residents, but all users of New Jersey pharmaceuticals,
wherever their injuries were suffered. It is a characteristic of regulatory law—conduct-regulating law—that it necessarily applies to
the regulated conduct wherever it is engaged in, wherever and to
146
whomever any injuries consequent on a violation occur. New Jersey’s statute, to the extent it is enforced, helps to assure national
and world markets of the safety of New Jersey pharmaceuticals, and
underscores the reliability of warnings accompanying them. The
company shares this interest with the state.
D. The Regulatory Interests of a State
Our reading of Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche underscores the importance of regulatory interests at the place of trial and reveals the
want of reason that seems to accompany failure to give effect to
them.
It is common wisdom that, over the long haul, companies concerned about vulnerability to suit, as, for example, a corporation
owning a highly polluting paper mill, will tend to produce its risky
or polluting products in a state the laws of which are, on the whole,
favorable to its activities. In addition, the presence of a valuable enterprise in a state, depending upon the means and political sophistication of that enterprise, will itself tend, over time, to produce
law protective of that enterprise. When, however, the influence
147
even of a valuable and politically powerful industry is not entirely
successful, and law is enacted reining in perceived excesses in that
industry, we may conclude that the regulatory interests of the state
are considerable, however modest the regulation.

145.
Cf. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935); Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 306 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1939) (both cases holding
that the interested forum need not apply the law of another interested state). I would go
beyond this. In my view, the interested forum should not apply another state’s law, even if the
other state also has a legitimate governmental interest in applying its law.
146.
Accord, DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 57.
147.
For a possible example of the political power of the national pharmaceutical industry, apparently extending to power over the Food and Drug Administration—the agency
that is supposed to be its watchdog—see the puzzling if not distressing failure-to-warn case
of Merck, Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct 1668 (2019). This case raises the
question whether a state-law failure-to-warn claim is preempted, in a case in which the FDA
rejected the drug manufacturer’s proposal to warn about a risk, although the FDA was provided with the relevant scientific data. The court remanded for discreet bench trial to assess the
FDA’s reasons for rejecting the proposed additional warning.
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Even so, in some instances a company in that industry may well
148
see the point of a given regulation and approve of it. As we have
seen, regulatory law offers benefits. Competitors in the state might
welcome a level playing field, and, after all, the state’s reputational
interests are also the industry’s.
The New Jersey high court fell down the rabbit hole of unreason
when it began rooting around for arguments that might justify its
failure to vindicate New Jersey’s regulatory interests. Rowe, like RJRNabisco, demonstrates the irrationality of defense arguments in cases in which the court refuses to allow a nonresident to try to recov149
er under forum law at the defendant’s home. One sees in these
examples the difficulty of finding rational bases for departures
from plaintiff-favoring forum law when the plaintiff, a nonresident,
150
leaves her home to sue the defendant at his. And each of our two
cases illustrates how the analyst’s familiar descriptor, “plaintifffavoring,” can fail to capture the regulatory interests of the forum,
which may be more aptly described as “defendant-regulating.”

148.
For one industry’s interest in uniform governance, see, e.g., Tim Worstall, Why
Google, Facebook, the Internet Giants, Are Arguing for Net Neutrality, FORBES (July 15, 2014, 4:08
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/07/15/why-google-facebook-theinternet-giants-are-arguing-for-net-neutrality/#771233d048a0.
149.
For the views of the chief proponent of codified rules, now more sophisticated than
past rules because distilled from insights gleaned from interest analysis and empirical study,
see, among his many fine writings, Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice-of-Law Methodology: Fifty
Years After Brainerd Currie, 2015 ILL. L. REV. 197 (2015). For an equally optimistic argument
that departures from forum law in the interests of comity and interstate harmony, fairness as
well as justice, are an important benefit of the law of conflict of laws, and that the occasion
for such departures can be reduced to a few simple rules, incorporating the insights of the
interest analysts, see Joseph William Singer, Multistate Justice: Better Law, Comity, and Fairness
in the Conflict of Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1923 (2015). For similar views brought to bear
more specifically upon transnational litigation, see the learned and interesting Donald Earl
Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010). For influential earlier challenges to interest analysis, see Douglas
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of
Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992); Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House
Without Foundations, 46 OH. ST. L. J. 459 (1985). But see Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80
GEORGETOWN L. J. 53 (1991); Louise Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law, 35 MERCER L.
REV. 595 (1984) (arguing that departures from forum law are irrational, discriminatory, unjust, and unconstitutional). I have proposed that the whole field be reorganized by kinds of
conflict, as identified by interest analysis, rather than kinds of claims. See Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra note 106. But, in the realist tradition, I have
had to come to a simpler conclusion. The only rule I rely on here is the rule of lex fori.
150.
Of course, cases will arise in which a faraway state boasts law that is “better,” law that
is remedial, as opposed to the defendant-protecting law of the forum. (The plaintiff will
have been forced to the defendant-protecting forum by jurisdictional rules, or by the universality of a particular defendant-protecting rule.) In such cases, the forum tempted to “apply”
better law should instead “adopt” it as its own. According to local-law theory, as developed by
American legal realists, the law applied by the forum, whatever its source, is always the forum’s own law, as a practical matter, because it reflects the forum’s own policy choices.
Moreover, honest adoption of the chosen rule, when possible, will help to minimize the discrimination and dysfunction that accompany a departure from pre-existing forum law.
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The good news from New Jersey is that, in 2017, in the case of
McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche, New Jersey’s Supreme Court, in ef151
fect, repudiated Rowe. On the certified question whether New
Jersey’s equitable tolling provision could be applied to keep alive a
nonresident’s case against Hoffmann-La Roche (a case also involving Accutane and the inadequacy of its warnings), the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that New Jersey’s equitable tolling law was indeed applicable, and the plaintiff would have a chance to prove
152
her case. The court relied on New Jersey’s strong regulatory in153
terests in the safety of New Jersey pharmaceuticals. Although the
court avoided dealing with Rowe beyond a bare irrelevant citation
to it, McCarrell was an obvious repudiation of the reasoning in
Rowe. The New Jersey court reached this result under Restatement
(Second), but it acknowledged that it would have reached the same
154
result under its former method, governmental interest analysis.
III. SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Democratic Theory and Local Law Theory
(1) On departing from forum law. Perhaps it is time to
acknowledge that departures from the law of the forum are problematic. It is understood that such departures from the law of the
155
forum are discriminatory. But commentators (myself included)
have not sufficiently taken into account that departures from the
law of the forum will also undermine the regulatory concerns of
the forum when the forum is the defendant’s home state. Those
are cases in which, as I have been arguing, regulatory interests
need to be recognized and accorded full value, mindful of the fact

151.
McCarrell v. Hoffmannn-La Roche, Inc., 153 A.3d 207 (N.J. 2017); see also In re Accutane Litigation, 194 A.3d 503 (N.J. 2018). In this latter case, a class action, the New Jersey
court held the presumption of adequacy of warnings to have been rebutted, where Hoffmann-La Roche could not have known of the particular risk, a risk of inflammatory bowel
disease. Of course, Hoffmann knows now.
152.
McCarrell, 153 A.3d at 225.
153.
Id. at 211 (stating that “Our jurisprudence has long recognized that this State has a
substantial interest in deterring its manufacturers from placing dangerous products in the
stream of commerce. Inadequate warning labels can render prescription medications dangerous.”).
154.
Id.
155.
For the leading early work on discrimination in the conflict of laws, see Brainerd
Currie & Herma Hill Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal
Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1960); Brainerd Currie & Herma Hill Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960).
For the “comfort” of the American Law Institute (ALI) reporters with this stubborn fact, see
infra Part III-C.
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that regulatory law is likely to be law that has overcome powerful
political opposition for critical reasons of public safety or order.
The forum with regulatory interests raises most acutely the general question whether it is ever appropriate for a court to disregard
its own laws and policies. If the honest answer seems to be “No,”
the logical conclusion is that abstract choice-of-law “rules” are fundamentally unsound. It is the whole point of choice-of-law rules to
decide, in an abstract, neutral way, whether or not to give access to
the forum’s own law. The first questions that come to mind are
whether, and how, a court can disregard the commands of its own
legislature—a legislature voted into office by its own citizenry? How
can it do this when under the oath of office? What theory of democracy could support judicial disregard of an American state’s
own legislation, if it is constitutional and there is no supreme federal law to the contrary? For that matter, how can any state supreme court disregard its own cases, without candidly overruling
them? The more urgent questions are whether local law obtained
in the public interest and for the general welfare, notwithstanding
great political pressure, might even be the more precious when
within the special keeping of local courts.
These questions are complicated by an old observation. All law
156
applied in courts can be seen as local law. When a court chooses
some other state’s law, it is, after all, making its own policy choice.
These questions are further complicated by the fact that a state legislature can certainly empower its courts to apply the laws of other
sovereigns. The legislature can enact a code of choice-of-law rules.
Or it can authorize courts to develop choice-of-law rules.
We can acknowledge these complicaations and nevertheless see
that political theory, democratic values, and the oath of office all
suggest that a court’s duty is to its own statutes and cases. In this
country, of course, state law must give way to supreme federal law,
but that imperative aside, it appears that the interested forum cannot depart from its own law without discrimination and other un157
fairness.

156.
For early realist perceptions that the forum always applies its own law whatever it
says it is doing, see, e.g., Guinness v. Miller, 291 F. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Hand, L., stating
that “no court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign, and, when a suitor comes to
a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can only invoke an obligation recognized by
that [the forum] sovereign”); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict
of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 469 (1924). See also Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy
and the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L.J. 736, 748 (1924) (regarding local policy); see also David
Cavers, The Two “Local Law” Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV. 822 (1950); Frederick J. de Sloovère,
The Local Law Theory and Its Implications in the Conflict of Laws, 41 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1928).
157.
For my long-discomfort with departures from forum law, see supra note 149.
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Prudential considerations alone should counsel greater respect
for the law of the forum. Since plaintiffs tend to sue where they
can win, the plaintiff enters the forum as an agent of enforcement
of law and local policy. When such private attorneys general are
denied access to local law, the chance of enforcement is lost, and
the forum relinquishes its own justice.
(2) The non-neutrality of “neutral” systems. “Neutral” systems of abstract rules purporting to require disinterested, fair “choices” of
other states’ laws can produce departures from the law of the court
chosen by plaintiffs, and thus inevitably must often yield defendant-favoring results. In other words, choice-of-law rules are likely to
be defendant-biased, since they exist to legitimize departures from
the law of the forum.
Consistent forum bias is plaintiff-biased, no doubt. But it has this
merit, that the plaintiff seeks enforcement of law. And it has this
limit, that the plaintiff does not necessarily “win,” but gains only a
chance to prove its case, or has restored to it the verdict of a jury.
On the other hand, consistent defendant bias has this demerit,
that the law under which an action was brought will not be enforced. And defendant-bias suffers from an immoderate and unjust
consequence, that the defendant, an alleged wrongdoer, typically
“wins,” and does so without trial of the merits. One sees this with
disturbing clarity in cases against known predators such as RJRNabisco.
That courts are free to “choose” the law that governs them is a
long-hallowed and unshakable tradition, but it is troubling. It is especially troubling when choices of law are effected through application of a set of “rules.” Rules, gratifyingly neutral because of their
very abstraction, even if codified and enacted, are only unrealities
superimposed upon reality. By design, they are mechanisms detached from the human crises to which they are addressed. In the
two examples this Article offers, I think the reader will feel not only the offense to democracy when the forum denies its own law, but
also, in the very arbitrariness of such denials, an offense to due
process, a risk of pointless injustice when a departure from forum
law will favor a tortfeasor for no reason, and an appearance of bias
when, as is likely, that tortfeasor is a resident of the forum.
In a wholly domestic version of Rowe, what would authorize New
Jersey to deprive Rowe of his day in court? What purpose would be
served by not putting him to his proof? What purpose would be
served by shielding Hoffmann-La Roche from having to defend
against accusations of reckless indifference which we know to be
accurate? Why, then, should it make a difference that the plaintiff,
Robert Rowe, is a nonresident? Does not a discrimination between
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residents and nonresidents need justification? Must not a discrimination have at least some rational basis? Under Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, can residence in another state of this
Union, without more, justify denying access to the law of the forum?
The starry-eyed search for better choice-of-law systems, it would
appear, has been naïve, mistaken, and indeed, seriously subversive
of the rule of law.
(3) The “better law” problem. Not all departures from forum law
are defendant-favoring. Consider a case in which law is chosen
through the blind application of some naïve “jurisdictionselecting” choice rule (such as “the law of the place of injury gov158
erns if it is also the place of conduct” ), and by some stroke of
luck the plaintiff is thereby afforded a chance to prove her case—a
159
chance which forum law would have denied her. While the defendant-oriented observer may feel some annoyance, the plaintifffavoring observer may feel a twinge of gladness for the fortunate
plaintiff. It is part of her good fortune that, as it happens, the chosen state does have constitutional power, since, as place of injury
and conduct, it has strong deterrent and remedial interests in having its deterrent and remedial law applied. But we may feel some
unease. We know that the forum is the place where the defendant’s insurer has a principal place of business and where both parties reside, and we know that as joint domicile of the parties, the
forum picks up some power to settle their dispute. Let us suppose
that the law of the forum favors the defendant. The parties, let us
suppose, are related—husband and wife. Let us suppose that the
forum protects its insurance companies from suits that might be
collusive. In a case such as this, the departure from forum law may
not seem quite right. The forum here has a legitimate interest in
applying its law, and thus constitutional power to do so. Although
the law at the place of injury and conduct is more remedial, and, in
my view, “better,” I have been arguing that the interested forum
160
cannot depart from its own law.

158.
This is the position of the ALI in the forthcoming RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6.04.
159.
This anomalous situation might arise for any reason, including careless legal representation. It might arise, for example, in a case dismissed for forum non conveniens, on the
theory that the plaintiff should sue in the country in which she was injured. Once at that
foreign locale she finds, to her relief, that that place chooses to apply the law of the place of
conduct, which turns out to be favorable to her, although the law of the place of injury itself
would not have been favorable to her.
160.
See Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra note 106, at
2017.
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With this “better law” problem, I am invoking the early work of
Professor Robert Leflar, the legal theorist who advocated that the
161
forum choose “better law.” Better law was one of Leflar’s influen162
tial “choice-influencing considerations,” to be used in deciding
cases of true conflict. “Better” law, to Leflar, I would venture to say,
was remedial law. It is true that, in the run of tort cases, plaintifffavoring law is, in fact, “better,” in the sense that the typical plaintiff seeks enforcement of law. The plaintiff in a case of tort vindicates the basic compensatory and deterrent policies underlying the
163
law of torts. These are policies that are widely shared. The policies underlying tort defenses, on the other hand, are generally quite
local. They are exceptions to more widely-shared tort policies, and
are deployed to ensure the well-being of some valued local enterprise or industry.
The home of a great manufacturer of washing machines might
provide a defense or two for cases of washing-machine floods—
perhaps a short statute of limitations, or a cap on damages. But defenses reflect an essentially parochial state interest. Other states
may or may not share interests in sparing the makers of washing
machines from oppressive liabilities. But all states share an interest
in remedying the harms caused to their residents by badly designed products, and in deterring bad design in products sold on
their markets or sold to their residents.
Lawyers and judges are rarely explicit about remedial law as
“better law,” not liking to seem to be favoring a party. But the re161.
Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
267, 275 passim (1966).
162.
Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1584, 1586–88 (1966). The five considerations were: (1) predictability of result, (2)
preservation of interstate or international order, (3) simplicity in application for the judiciary, (4) the forum’s governmental interests, and (5) application of the better law. See also
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 377, 377 (1966) (proposing “principles of preference”). See also the famed and widely
disregarded “Section 6” of RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1967), with
its list of factors to be taken into account in determining the state of most significant contact
with a case. Good writers and fine judges from their day to this have not grasped that true
conflicts do not need solving—that the interested forum must apply its own law. Weinberg,
A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra note 106. I would go further today, and
say that even the uninterested forum in a false conflict case (i.e., the other state is an interested state) must apply its own law. That is because I am identifying adjudicatory interests.
See infra Part III-D. If more remedial law (i.e., “better” law) exists within the rationallyassessed power of another state, the forum tempted to “apply” it should, instead, adopt the
remedial position as its own.
163.
But see Larry Kramer, The Myth of the “Unprovided-For” Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045
(1989). Dean Kramer does not want to take into account this feature of tort policy (that it is
widely shared) and the essential local-ness of defendant-protecting policy. Id. at 1056. Thus,
he rejects the proposition advanced, for example, by the late Robert Sedler, that the forum
apply the law reflecting the shared policies of all states. Robert Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181, 190
(1977).
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medial vector of law is basic, and there are important recognitions
of this truth. We find it in the familiar maxim of ancient Roman
164
law, “Ubi jus, ibi remedium;” and in Blackstone’s Commentaries; echoed in our greatest case, Marbury v. Madison:
[I]t is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy,
and every injury its proper redress [quoting Blackstone].
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws fur165
nish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.
This essential justice-seeking vector of law in courts is also found in
such famous American opinions at federal common law as Chief
Justice Chase’s, while sitting on Circuit in admiralty way back in
1873 in the case of The Sea Gull, Chase wrote, “[C]ertainly it better
becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to
166
withhold it by established and inflexible rules.”
All this said, there remains something jarring about the commentators’ enthusiasm for better law. It is not obvious, as we have
seen, that a court should be free to depart from the commands of
its own legislature in order to apply perceived “better” law elsewhere. Fortunately it is somewhat unlikely that there will be better—more remedial—law elsewhere, since the plaintiff has had the
choice of forum. But my point here is that departures from an interested forum’s law, for better or worse, are not, at root, consistent with democratic theory, and, when effected without sufficient rational basis, will turn out to be unconstitutional.
It might be argued that, in our New Jersey pharmaceuticals case,
Michigan’s law was not only constitutional but even the better law
for the case, based as it was on the FDA’s approval. True, Hoffmann-La Roche’s warnings had become inadequate, and the FDA
had taken no further action. However, the FDA has the institutional
competence to weigh the costs and benefits of a rule as time passes,
167
and to strike the right balance. Thus, it might be supposed that
the state should defer to the federal agency.
This argument fails for three reasons. First, it has never been
supposed that FDA standards create a ceiling, rather than a floor,

164.
165.
166.
167.

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1768).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C. Md. 1865) (Chase C.J., sitting on Circuit).
I am indebted to Melissa Wasserman and Tom McGarity for this hypothesis.
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on the states’ powers over the health of their citizens and the duties of their companies. Second, New Jersey’s legislature had already determined the degree of deference its courts owed to the
agency determination, and had created a slightly higher and therefore “better” level of protection for consumers of New Jersey
pharmaceuticals. And third, the balance struck here was not between the FDA and New Jersey, but rather between New Jersey and
Michigan. But no rational application of Michigan’s conclusive
presumption was available for balancing against New Jersey’s regulatory interest—as we have seen.
“Better law” is, perhaps, the best rationale for departures from
forum law. The law of conflict of laws itself might well have its
origin as an escape device—as an effort by judges to escape unjust
but applicable home law, and to find better law elsewhere. Choice
rules become more intelligible if the effort is to find better law
than the forum can supply—a way to give a tort plaintiff a chance
to prove her case.
I have suggested in earlier work that the forum adopt rather than
168
“apply” identified “better” law. Earlier American legal realists
169
made similar suggestions. Once a law is seen as “better,” the practical effect of choosing it will be to undermine the previous position. Counsel will point out that home law was departed from, and
argue for the better position. The sensible thing for courts to do
with perceived “better” law is to adopt a new rule, rather than purport to continue to honor the old, while “choosing” better law
elsewhere.
B. The Constitution and Choices of Law
(1) Arbitrary choices and due process. When the constitutional powers of, and constraints upon, courts choosing law are better understood, it will be better remembered that application of an uninterested state’s law is unconstitutional not only because it is
discriminatory but also, and especially, because it is not due pro170
cess. The choice of Michigan law in Rowe’s case was clearly unconstitutional on both grounds.

168.
Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra note 106, at 2001,
2021; Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1632
(2005); see also Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1237 (2011). For earlier “local law theory,” see supra note 156.
169.
In the view of the American legal realists, the forum always applies its own law,
whatever it says it is doing. Op. cit. supra note 156.
170.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818–19 (1985) (holding that application of the law of a state with insignificant contacts with a case violates the Due Process
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Choices of law are subject to constitutional control under the
Due Process Clause because due process requires some rational basis
for every rule applied in courts. The requirement of some rational
basis is a requirement of a legitimate governmental interest. Courts
are not free to apply the law of a state without a legitimate governmental interest in the application.
171
In 1930, in Home Insurance Company v. Dick, the Supreme Court
laid the basis for this clarified modern understanding. The Court
held, by Justice Brandeis, that the uninterested Texas forum in that
case did not have power to apply its own law to a contingent hypothetical obligation of New York re-insurers in connection with a
boat fire in Mexico. Texas had no legitimate interest in governing
the case by its own law and could not do so without violating the
172
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Note the interesting parallel between Brandeis’s thinking in Dick
173
and his thinking in Erie. In both cases the Court held that the uninterested forum—the courts of a sovereign without a legitimate
governmental interest in the issue before it—could not constitu174
tionally apply its own law to that issue. In Dick, there was insufficient Texas contact with the case to generate a legitimate Texas
governmental interest in it; none could be identified to justify Texas’s displacement of relevant Mexican or New York law. In Erie, no
sovereign interest of the United States could be identified to justify
a court’s displacement of relevant state law.
(2) Reasonableness versus rationality. There is a further problem
that the Constitution creates for choice-of-law rules. How can abstract “rules” for choosing law avoid arbitrary or irrational governance? In Rowe, what could have been more reasonable than application of the law of the place of purchase, treatment, injury, and the
plaintiff’s own residence? But Michigan turned out to have zero interest in the result, protecting another state’s tortfeasor, while
denying Michigan’s own resident a chance to prove his case. There
is a difference, it turns out, between reasonableness and rationality;
and irrational law cannot be due process.

Clause; relying on the interest-analytic test announced in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302, 312–13 (1981)); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (striking down the law of
an uninterested state under the Due Process Clause).
171.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397; cf. Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 9–10 (1958).
172.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397.
173.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that only the law of an identified sovereign can constitutionally apply in American courts, and that the sovereign whose
law governs an issue is the same in all courts).
174.
For exploration of this parallel between Erie and Dick, see Louise Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, supra note 56.
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The United States Supreme Court may never acknowledge the
175
due process violation in a case like Rowe, but we can. We know
that contacts, however many and seemingly important, are not al176
ways “significant.” A contact becomes significant only when it
generates a legitimate interest in governance. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist put this, “for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a
constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamen177
tally unfair.”
(3) The especially arbitrary choice. It is an interesting feature of the
choice-of-law problem that American courts following choice-of-law
rules will often choose law without any knowledge of what the law
is at the respective concerned states. Choice rules commonly
choose places, not laws.
In applying a typical such rule, let us say, “the rule of the place
of conduct governs the conduct of the defendant,” courts are content to choose law without knowing its content. The veil of ignorance, for such courts, is a warrant of special neutrality and fairness, an assurance of the disinterestedness of the judges. But we
may wonder why Justice, rightly blind to fear or favor, should be
blind to justice itself. Typical choice rules are place-selecting—
178
”jurisdiction-selecting,” in David Cavers’ formulation —and, because deliberately blind to the law at the place selected, are as neutral as a flip of a coin. But who would want her legal rights determined by the flip of a coin? Does not such neutrality come at too
high a price if it can result in pointless denials of justice? The place
of injury or of conduct, or both, without any other contact with a
case, has compensatory and deterrent interests only. It will be
found to have no interest in applying a local defense to defeat or
diminish the otherwise meritorious claims of out-of-staters. And we
may find ourselves wondering whether the choice rule applied by
the court was as blindly neutral as had been hoped. There is the
likelihood that the judge purporting to be forced by a “rule” to
hand judgment to the defendant knows very well that that will be
the consequence of the choice.

175.
Id.
176.
The vague rule of the “place of most significant contact” has a built-in error of requiring a “balancing” of contacts. It is the popular general provision of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1967).
177.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818–19 (1985) (quoting the plurality
opinion in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981), with which the dissent
was in “substantial agreement”). The emphasis in the text above is supplied.
178.
David Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 201
(1933).
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I have focused here on due process, but it has long been understood that arbitrary choices of law are discriminatory as well as
179
wanting in due process. Such discrimination can be between the
parties in a case, between similarly situated plaintiffs in different
cases, and between similarly situated defendants in different cases.
It can invoke the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, as
well as the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the anti-discrimination component of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.
C. The ALI

180

and the Nonresident Plaintiff

(1) Discriminating against nonresidents. The preliminary draft of
Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws takes the position, contrary to
that urged here, that the forum should not impose liability on its
resident defendant for a violation of forum standards when to do
181
so would benefit a nonresident plaintiff. The position seems discredited in the very utterance. But echoing Justice Alito’s cri de
coeur in RJR-Nabisco, “We cannot rule the world,” the Reporters
182
quote Judge Fuld in the old casebook case of Neumeier v. Kuehner,
remarking that to allow the nonresident to recover for a violation
183
of forum law would be to supply “manna to all the world.” In this
view, justice for persons whose own states will not help them seems
unreasonable. Yet injustice for such persons also seems unreasonable.
Take the particular problem of the nonresident plaintiff who
has been injured elsewhere, one in the position of young Rowe, or
the plaintiff countries in RJR-Nabisco. The Reporters of the American Law Institute’s current draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of
Laws do not want to see the ‘license to kill’ that the forum virtually
issues when it withholds its justice from anyone injured elsewhere
184
by a resident. It is the nonresident who most often has been injured elsewhere. And consider that, if all states with remedial law
refuse to apply it for nonresidents, there will exist a massive closing

179.
See Currie & Schreter, supra note 155 and accompanying text.
180.
Disclosure: I am an adviser to of the current ALI project, DRAFT RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 3). I confess to unhappiness with the commitment of the project to its proliferation of “rules.”
181.
Reporters’ Memorandum, DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM.
LAW INST., Council Draft No. 3).
182.
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 A.2d 454, 458–59 (N.Y. 1972).
183.
DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 57, at § xv (quoting
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 A.2d 454, 458–59 (N.Y. 1972)).
184.
Brainerd Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L. J. 1, 35–36
(1963), SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS, supra note 131, at 703.
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of the doors of justice for the injured, who, beyond their own
185
states’ borders, are nonresidents everywhere. Why would that be
a good thing? Indeed, why would it ever be wrong for a court to
furnish its justice evenhandedly to all who appear before it? If a
court declines to discriminate against nonresidents, why is that a
bad thing?
(2) The problem of the “magnet forum.” If a court becomes a “magnet” for its remedial law, or for its competence, fairness, and acces186
sibility in cases within its jurisdiction, why is that a bad thing?
There may be a fear that companies will flee the state in which local courts enforce regulatory acts of the local legislature. In such
cases, the political power of such companies was insufficient to
block regulatory law, yet the threat of their leaving must depress
the spirit of independence in any thoughtful judge. Threats, and
distinctions in political power, are precisely the sort of external influences on a case that are not supposed to weigh, in a perfect
world, on the scales of justice. In the face of a possible loss of major
business to the state, one can only admire the courage of justicedispensing courts that do enforce local regulatory law.
It may be pie in the sky to say this, but if all states reliably did enforce local regulatory law, much injustice would be avoided.
Meanwhile, a court that is valued so highly for fairness and competence as to become a magnet for multi-sovereign litigation (a court
such as the illustrious Eastern District of New York, in which the
European Community chose to bring its case against RJR) invites
admiration rather than outrage. And the citizens of the magnet
state can be confident that their renowned courts administer the
law of the legislature they themselves have elected.
(3) The ALI and the forum shopper. It is not entirely clear why
plaintiffs’ freedom to choose the place of trial is so distressing to
the ALI, and indeed to many judges and lawyers. Law students
learn to think of forum shopping as an abuse, notwithstanding that
the defendant in any event has to be within the jurisdiction of the
forum. All this evident revulsion suggests a mental image of greedy
lawyers who easily could have sued where plaintiffs reside, rushing
to magnet forums, confident that the magnet forums can be
counted on to provide “manna for all the world.” But in an actual
case on the facts of Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche, it is hard to see how
this “manna” scenario would play out. There are no lawyers, greedy
or otherwise, urging patients to demand Accutane from their doctors. Nor are there greedy patients out there risking death in order

185.
186.

Weinberg, Against Comity, supra note 149, at 70–81.
See also, on forum shopping, supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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to obtain damages in New Jersey. Nor should we regard with suspicion lawyers defending misbehaving companies. What we do see in
litigation of some importance are lawyers practicing our learned
profession on either side of a versus sign, and generally doing so
quite creditably.
The Reporters are not embarrassed to say that they are “unaware
of any support” for the position that a nonresident plaintiff should
187
be allowed to recover under forum law.
They decline to
acknowledge the existence of regulatory interests at the forum,
and in service of that stringency they are resolved to tolerate
wholesale injustice to nonresident plaintiffs, not to mention disregard of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Yet the Reporters
acknowledge, at least, that their position is discriminatory. Unnerv188
ingly, they say that they are “comfortable” with this.
The Reporters may have worked themselves into such positions
in part because they sometimes use the place of injury as a “neutral” tie-breaker, and any such abstract rule can yield arbitrary results. Yet the geographical location either of injuries or the injured
is not a matter of concern to the conduct-regulating state. With
preternaturally unperturbed inconsistency, the Reporters
189
acknowledge this also.
D. Regulatory Interests and the “Unprovided” Case
(1) No law for the case. Robert Rowe’s case would seem to present
a classic example of what experts in the conflict of laws would term
190
“an unprovided case.” The unprovided case is a configuration of
191
cases first identified by Brainerd Currie. An unprovided case is a
case in which the law of the plaintiff’s state favors the defendant,
192
and the law of the defendant’s state favors the plaintiff. In such a
case, Currie posited that neither state would have any interest in
having its law applied, since the plaintiff’s residence with defendant-favoring law could have no interest in favoring other states’ de-

187.
Draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws, supra note 57, at § xvi. 15.
188.
Id. at § xv.
189.
Id.
190.
Writers today typically use better English and term this sort of case “unprovidedfor.” I prefer Currie’s original usage.
191.
BRAINERD CURRIE, Survival of Actions, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS, supra note 131, at 152 & n.79. Currie argued that in such cases the forum should apply its own law, as the only clearly constitutional choice. A departure from forum law would
set up an irrational discrimination between similarly situated parties.
192.
Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS, supra note 131, at 188.
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fendants, and the defendant’s residence with plaintiff-favoring law
193
could have no interest in favoring other states’ plaintiffs.
In this Article, however, I have not viewed Rowe v. Hoffmann-La
Roche as an unprovided case—although it fits the description. Rather, I have treated Rowe as a false conflict in which New Jersey was
the only interested state. A false conflict case is one in which only
one state has any interest in the application of its law. A false conflict is easily resolved by applying the law of “the only interested
194
state.”
In Rowe’s case, viewed as an “unprovided” one, New Jersey law
favored the Michigan plaintiff, and Michigan law favored the New
Jersey defendant. But by jettisoning the language about law “favoring” one side or the other, and identifying law that is regulatory,
we have been able to see the otherwise submerged interests of New
Jersey in Rowe. What might have looked like an “unprovided” case
thus begins to look very different.
Somewhat to my chagrin, however, this way of thinking about
Rowe puts me into unaccustomed agreement with an influential argument put forward by Larry Kramer. In a well-known early paper,
Dean Kramer took the position that Currie’s unprovided case is a
195
“myth.” It was part of his argument that some governmental interest can usually be drummed up in one of the concerned states.
For example, an unprovided case like Rowe might arise—one in
which the interests of the two states were congruent, the difference
being merely an exception. The unprovided case would then turn
out to be a no-conflict case. (This was the initial reasoning of Judge
LeFelt in the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rowe.) Kramer also
pointed out that the place of injury with inapplicable defendantfavoring law always has a residual interest, qua place of injury, in
196
deterrence of a tort on its territory. Once some residual interest
of that kind can be found, the unprovided case ceases to exist.
So, by identifying the regulatory interest of New Jersey in Rowe, I
197
seem to have illustrated Dean Kramer’s point for him —that the
unprovided case is a “myth.”

193.
Id.
194.
Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS, supra note 131, at 726.
195.
Kramer, supra note 163.
196.
Id. at 1045–46.
197.
See Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, supra note 106, at n.37.
As Dean Kramer saw, the residual law of the place of injury with an inapplicable defense is
always remedial, and makes the forum at the place of injury an interested forum, notwithstanding its local defense. Residual remedial tort law at the place of injury is as applicable to
nonresidents as it is to residents, since the forum cannot make its territory safe for its residents without making it safe for its visitors. Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of
Laws, supra note 168. Thus, when the plaintiff is suing at home, which is also the place of
injury, and the home state has defendant-favoring law, the uninterested forum should not

56

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:1

I pause to note that Dean Kramer’s point does not matter. In a
putatively unprovided case, as elsewhere, forum law is “the only
198
clearly constitutional choice.” If law must be applied unjustifiably, at least forum law will not discriminate between similarly situated parties in later cases. So whether Rowe was a false conflict in
which New Jersey was the only interested state, or an unprovided
case, the result should be the same. In either case, New Jersey law
needed to be applied.
(2) The regulatory state. At a deeper level, I have shown here that
the unprovided case—indeed, a “myth”—is a myth not only because some interest in either contact state can always be drummed
up. Rather, I am arguing that affirmative standards are not the beginning and end of a legislature’s regulatory expedients. A liability
rule of any kind at the forum where the defendant resides—a feature of the cases studied here, and an essential feature of Currie’s
“unprovided” category—is likely to be as defendant-regulating as it
is “plaintiff-favoring.” In other words, a liability rule can be per199
ceived as regulatory. This is also an insight of Michael Green. And
so the case, “unprovided” at first blush, in which there is a liability
rule at the forum, becomes a false conflict case rather than an unprovided one.
In Rowe, the imposition of liability simpliciter would have been
more strongly regulatory than New Jersey’s law. Instead, since liability already existed under state common law, the New Jersey legislature provided a defense of immunity and an exception to that
defense, an exception for reckless disregard. This was regulation by
exception, if you will, one of the kinds of unprovided cases which
Dean Kramer (and I) turn into a false conflict.
I would prefer to view such cases in a more general way. Governmental interests can be protective and regulatory at the same
time. New Jersey’s regulation in Rowe operated to protect plaintiff

extend the benefit of its defenses to the nonresident defendant, in whom it has no legitimate governmental interest. Instead, the forum should be guided by its own underlying residual tort policies, as Dean Kramer would also say.
If the forum purports to apply the law of some third state, assuming some plausible interest
can be found there, it would risk plunging into the general dysfunction seen in McCann v.
Foster Wheeler, L.L.C., 225 P.3d 516 (Cal. 2010) (applying the local defense of a third state on
speculative reasoning, to frustrate the remedial laws of both concerned states). The McCann
court also declared that thenceforth California companies could commit torts extraterritorial to California with impunity in California courts). This is similar to the Supreme Court’s
new territorialism—amounting to a bizarre invitation to wrongdoers to behave badly when
abroad and then hide out at home.
198.
See Currie & Schreter, supra note 155. Since departures from forum law raise issues
of discrimination, forum law is the only clearly constitutional choice in all cases except those
few false conflicts in which the other state is the only interested state and no adjudicatory
interest of the forum can be discerned.
199.
Michael S. Green, The Return of the Unprovided-For Case, 51 GA. L. REV. 763 (2017).
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patients using New Jersey pharmaceuticals, but only in egregious
cases of deliberate or reckless failure to update warnings in light of
experience. In ordinary cases of mere negligence the same provision operated to protect New Jersey defendant drug companies.
The two concerns existed together in the statute.
New Jersey’s law on damages in failure-to-warn cases is similarly
Janus-faced. Damages may be awarded only where punitive damages would be warranted, and this favors plaintiffs. But punitive damages themselves are proscribed, and this protects New Jersey drug
makers from open-ended dollar liabilities.
The New Jersey legislation affects plaintiffs in other ways as well.
When the defendant’s conduct does not warrant punitive damages,
New Jersey’s presumption about the sufficiency of warnings becomes as conclusive as Michigan’s. The plaintiff’s right to sue is extinguished. In other words, the statute is a threat as well as a prom200
ise, providing for contingencies facing either way.
The New Jersey statute is properly characterized as “regulatory”
when we recognize that it cannot be confined rationally to New
201
Jersey plaintiffs. Insofar as warnings are concerned, it requires
good behavior by New Jersey drug makers—good behavior to all
the world. The state’s identified regulatory interests are reputational. The legislature wishes the entire market of its pharmaceuti202
cals industry, world-wide, to stand assured of the probity of New
Jersey pharmaceuticals houses, and of the safety of their drugs, as
reflected in the thoroughness and clarity of their warnings. This
latter point suggests that the regulatory interest of the state in
Rowe, even in enforcing a mere exception to a defense, is much too
encompassing to warrant a description of Rowe’s case as “unprovided.” Nor is that regulatory interest, embodied as it is in a statute,
in any sense residual, or somehow drummed up.
So, yes, Rowe was a false conflict to begin with, and New Jersey
was the only interested state. In other words, the unprovided case
is more of a myth than Dean Kramer may have supposed, and his
“myth” thesis is descriptive of a broader swathe of cases than he or
I have anticipated.

200.
See supra note 7 on the availability vel non of punitive damages when a legislature
provides for treble damages.
201.
Currie eventually recognized regulatory interests, but considered them “altruistic.”
However, he acknowledged that vindication of altruistic interests is well within the powers of
courts. CURRIE, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS,
supra note 131, at 617.
202.
The fact that Hoffmann-La Roche was a Swiss giant’s American subsidiary may suggest, but does not require, a market predominantly nationwide in the United States rather
than a global one.
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(3) Adjudicatory interests. Beyond this, I begin to suspect that
Brainerd Currie’s category of “unprovided” cases apparently can
amount to a “myth” whether or not some traditional interest in
one of the contact states can be smoked out. I am thinking of the
possibility of adjudicatory interests. Adjudicatory interests may be
important enough to be taken into account. The forum would appear to have the interest that arises when both parties stand before
it and submit to its justice. Law-providing and justice-providing interests would be subsumed under this heading. Assuming uncon203
tested jurisdiction, there will be dispute-resolving, law-providing,
justice-affording interests that arguably turn the forum into a sufficiently interested one to justify it not only in taking a case but also
in furnishing its own brand of justice for it.
These interests are akin to, if not the perfect equivalent of, the
204
similarly compound adjudicatory interests of the joint domicile.
In the case of Hughes v. Fetter, for example, the Court, by Justice
Black, held that a state court must take jurisdiction over a sister
205
state’s transitory cause of action. That holding is important and
right. But Justice Black was assuming, in the fashion then customary, that the resultant case would be tried under the sister state’s
law, because the tort “arose” in the sister state. It might explain
Hughes v. Fetter in a more modern way to say that the forum state
had no interest in not taking the case. But beyond this, I would argue that the forum state in Hughes v. Fetter had every interest in settling the dispute between the parties, because of a fact not much
emphasized by Justice Black. They were joint domiciliaries of the
forum state. Indeed, a plaintiff may always sue at home, assuming
jurisdiction over the defendant. The plaintiff pays taxes to fund
her own state’s courts. It does not matter where her claim “arose.”
These sorts of interests, although merely adjudicatory, are
stronger than might be thought. Imagine a case Currie would call
an unprovided one. For the sake of argument, let us disregard the
fact that the liability rule at the forum reflects a regulatory interest,
and assume, as a traditional interest analyst would, that the forum

203.
For a learned and comprehensive discussion of the effect of personal jurisdiction
limits on trans-sovereign litigation, see Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State Sovereignty Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2016); see also for valuable insights,
Charles W. Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV.
567, 623) (2007) (discussing the extraterritorial reach of regulatory interests at the forum,
and arguing that only the law of personal jurisdiction can limit that reach). I agree with him.
204.
See Linda J. Silberman & Nathan D. Yaffe, The Transnational Case in Conflict of Laws:
Two Suggestions for the New Restatement Third of Conflict of Laws, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
405 (2017) (finding, upon impressive empirical investigation, across-the-board support in
courts for the law of the joint domicile).
205.
341 U.S. 609 (1951) (placing state courts under obligation to try a transitory action
arising in a sister state, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec 1).
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is an “uninterested” one. We can see, nevertheless, that the “uninterested” forum’s contacts with a case, qua forum, are hardly inconsiderable.
The defendant has submitted itself to the benefits and
burdens of forum law. This is the classic understanding
of a constitutional exercise of jurisdiction.
The plaintiff has shopped for the forum, precisely, for
its law.
The judges at the forum are pledged under the oath of
office to uphold the forum’s law.
The insurer presumably has the actuarial expertise to
have predicted and evaluated the risk of trial at a place
with plaintiff-favoring law, and to have accounted for
that risk in the premium charged the defendant.
True, these connections with the forum are not “significant” in
the sense in which any choice-of-law theory would find them. True,
the weighing or balancing of interests, especially insignificant ones,
is an unprofitable enterprise. But together, these identified connections between the forum and the the case do appear to take on
some weight as against the position of the other state. Consider
that the other state in our putatively unprovided case can boast as a
“contact” only the residence of a plaintiff it will not allow to recov206
er, and, perhaps an injury on its territory which it declines to re207
mediate. And this other state has no interest in frustrating its resident’s chance to recover in any other state’s courts, as long as it
has no relation to the defendant. After all, the plaintiff’s uninterested state of residence is somewhat better off, as I have pointed
208
out here, when its resident returns with funds.
I have been trying to show that the forum is unlikely, whatever
the case, to be a wholly uninterested one. Moreover, I have argued
that the only law consistent with democratic theory is the law of the
forum—barring some statute authorizing courts in conflicts cases
206.
The plaintiff’s residence with no other contact with a case cannot rationally apply
defendant-favoring law, having no defendant to favor.
207.
The place of injury, with no other contact with a case, always retains remedial interests in safety, compensation, and deterrence. But if its law is defendant-favoring, application
of its law will fly in the face of its remedial interests. The defendant’s residence with no other contact with a case, having plaintiff-favoring law but having no contact with the plaintiff
or her injuries, nevertheless should not dismiss the plaintiff’s case. To do so would be to discriminate against nonresidents. This, of course, is the case that is the second subject of this
paper.
208.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text (pointing out that recovery in damages
can help to support disabled plaintiffs and their innocent dependents and heirs, insulating
them from dependency on local public and charitable resources, and can provide heirs, insulating them from undeserved hardship, and providing funds for reimbursement to unpaid
medical and caretaking creditors, while avoiding windfalls to insurers).
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to decline to follow their own precedents, or to fashion new rules
of their own, or to enforce a code of choice rules enacted by their
209
own legislature. In a sense, even sister state law in courts is forum
law, since in applying it judges make a policy choice. These things
being so, the conclusion that the forum should, and probably
must, apply its own law, should not be very surprising, although I
must acknowledge that few can be found today who would agree
with me about this.
CONCLUSION: THE PHENOMENON OF UNREASON
We see the force of regulatory interests quite vividly in our
transnational case, RJR-Nabisco, with the Patriot Act’s response to
9/11 in Civil RICO. More subtle is the regulatory interest of the
state in the case of Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche. But, overt or subtle,
when regulatory interests at the forum are apparent, it will not do
to say, “This is an uninterested state” simply because the state can
be said not to “favor” its own. A state or country, the laws of which
would bear down on its culpable resident defendants, cannot be
deemed to be “uninterested.”
The struggle for reason we have noted in the configuration of
cases explored here simply reflects—in two ways—the want of interest in the nonforum state in impeding vindication of the forum’s legitimate governmental interests. First, in every false conflict in which the forum is the only interested state, the nonforum
state will have no interest in applying its law, ex hypothesi. So, of
course, there will be a struggle to find some reason for applying
that other state’s law. This explains the futile struggle for reason in
cases like RJR-Nabisco and Rowe. Second, in every no-conflict case in
which forum policy is shared, the nonforum state will also have no
interest in applying its law. In RJR-Nabisco, the American forum
shared with the twenty-six plaintiff countries the policies grounding the act of Congress. The European Community had no interest
at all in impeding vindication of the United States’ legitimate governmental interests. A sovereign sharing the regulatory interest of
the forum will have as little reason as an uninterested sovereign in
furnishing a defense. So of course there were futile struggles for
reason in both RJR-Nabisco and Rowe.
We might suppose that a court has broad discretion to withhold
its own law for good and sufficient reasons. The problem—the sub-

209.
See, e.g. LA. CIV. CODE 3515 (Act of 1991). The author of the Louisiana choice-of-law
code was Symeon Symeonides.
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ject of this paper—is that good and sufficient reasons are not easily
found for doing so when a case falls within the home sovereign’s
sphere of legitimate governmental interests.
All law is limited by the rational scope of its purposes. When tort
law is plaintiff-favoring, it is also regulatory. As a practical matter,
law is deterrent when it is compensatory. And law’s regulatory purposes, as a general rule, are not territorially limited. Application of
case law limits on regulatory law, in my view, should require rational justification on the facts of the particular case. When reason
will not support those limits, the forum’s regulatory law must be
enforced.
We have seen here the difficulty courts at the regulatory state
encounter in a certain configuration of cases when they attempt to
depart from their own law. Arguments offered to support a departure from forum law in this class of cases can seem to turn sour,
like good milk curdling as we watch. Courts withholding regulatory
law, as we have seen in our analyses of Rowe and RJR-Nabisco, can
put into the hands of a predatory company a license to injure
without fear of damages in courts at home. This is a result as dangerous as it is arbitrary and unjust.
What Holmes called “the life of the law” has to be logic, in some
210
measure, as well as experience, although Holmes disputed this.
What I mean is that the life of the law, in large part, is reason. As
long as judges and lawyers fail to identify and accord due weight to
the purposes of law—to the legitimate governmental interests the
law would function to vindicate—there is an identified configuration of cases in which defenses are likely to turn irrational, and an
apparent want of neutrality is likely to embarrass judgment.
This too-common collapse of reason—and the collapse of justice
with it—is a rather startling—and indeed unsettling—discovery.
Unreason in the decision of cases can do no honor to our country,
our courts, or to the grand tradition of the rule of law.

210.
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